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Summary findings
Special strategies are needed to address the widespread  decentralization before sound advice can be given to
incidence of rural poverty in developing countries, but  policymakers.
initiatives aimed at improving the rural standard of living  He suggests a conceptual model - based on a
have not consistently reduced poverty.  "souffle" theory of decentralization - that incorporates
Parker examines the rationale for a specific rural focus  the essential elements of political, fiscal, and institutional
in poverty reduction programs and reviews recent  decentralization as they relate to rural development
attempts to encourage rural development. He discusses  outcomes.
the role decentralization could play in rural development  Like a souffle that requires just the right combination
programs and analyzes recent efforts to implement  of -anik,  eggs, and heat to rise, a successful program of
decentralized rural development programs.  decentralization must include just the right combination
Parker concludes that although decentralization  of political, fiscal, and institutional elements to improve
initiatives have a long history, much more needs to be  rural development outcomes.
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Poverty continues  to pervade  rural  areas  in developing  countries'.  Inappropriate
public  policies  and  ill-designed  programs  and  projects  have  both  served  to
impoverish  rural  communities.  As  reviewed  later  in  this  paper,  trade  and  fiscal
policies have often discriminated  against  agriculture.  Public expenditure  allocations
for agriculture  are often inadequate  and  frequently  misdirected,  providing  perverse
incentives  to producers  in the form of tax and  subsidy programs.  In addition,  recent
research  has  demonstrated  the  overriding  importance  of a  stable  macroeconomic
environment.  The best-designed  policies for rural  development  (RD) are likely  to fail
if a country  faces severe macroeconomic imbalances2.
Despite  recognition  of the  need for special  strategies  to address  the  widespread
incidence  of rural  poverty  in  developing  countries,  initiatives  aimed  at  bringing
about  a  transformation  of the  rural  standard  of living  have  not  had  a  consistent
impact on reducing  poverty. The failure  of the  most  recent  of these  interventions-
integrated  rural  development  (IRD)-has  left  a  policy  vacuum  as  donors  and
countries  struggle  to  find  new  ways  to  reduce  rural  poverty.  Recent  initiatives
designed  to  put  in  place  decentralized  mechanisms  for  RD offer  possibilities  for
building  on the essential  principles  of IRD while  avoiding problems  associated  with
an over-centralization  of functions  and responsibilities.
This  review  examines  the rationale  for a specific rural  focus and  reviews  recent
attempts  to  encourage  RD.  The  potential  role  for  decentralization  to  play  in
designing  improved  RD programs  is  discussed,  and  some  of the  recent  efforts  to
implement  programs  of decentralized  RD are described  and analyzed.
The  article  concludes  that  although  decentralization  initiatives  have  a  long
history,  much more needs  to be understood  with  respect  to the various  components
of decentralization  if sound  advice  is  to  be  given  to  policy-makers.  A conceptual
model  is  suggested  that  incorporates  the  essential  elements  of  decentralization
processes and  relates  them  to RD outcomes.
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CHARACTERISTICS  OF RURAL  AREAS
The  spatial  dispersion  of people  living  in  rural  areas  increases  the  cost  and
difficulty  of  providing  rural  goods  and  services  effectively.  Specific  economic
conditions  in  rural  areas  also  result  in  fewer  development  opportunities  being
available  than  in  non-rural  locations.  Agriculture  is  generally  the  most  important
economic  sector,  making  rural  areas  highly  dependent  on  the  performance  of  a
single  sector,  where  investments  are  risky.  In  addition,  the  tax  base  is  limited,
resulting  in rural  areas  often being unable  to mobilize sufficient  resources  to finance
their  own RD programs.
Furthermore,  rural  areas  are  often  politically  marginalized,  leaving  little
opportunity  for the rural  poor to influence government  policies.  In many developing
countries,  policies have consistently  discriminated  against  agriculture  through  high
levels  of taxation  and  other  macroeconomic  policies  that  have  adversely  affected
agricultural  performance  and  the  rural  tax  base,  resulting  in  a  ntet transfer  of
resources  out of rural  areas.
The impact of this  combination  of geographic,  economic and  political  factors  is a
high incidence of poverty and  a low level of development,  as measured  by indicators
such  as  rates  of literacy,  life  expectancy,  infant  mortality  and  malnutrition.  A
description  and  explanation  of this  discrimination  against  agriculture  and  rural
areas  has been given in the urban  bias  literature.
Urban  Bias
In his seminal  work on urban  bias, Lipton  (1977) maintains  that  urban  elites,  by
organizing,  centralizing  and  controlling  political  and  economic  power,  have  been
able  to  control  substantially  policies  and  the  distribution  of  resources  in  poor
developing  countries.  He  argues  that  despite  historically  high  levels  of economic
growth,  the  proportion  of rural  people living below a  fixed acceptable  standard  has
not fallen much. He further  attributes  this  to a deliberate  misallocation  of resources
between rural  and urban  areas.  He seeks  to demonstrate  that:
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"many  of the  resources  allocated  by state  action  to city-dwellers  would have
earned  a higher  return  in rural  areas;  that  private  individuals,  furthermore,
were  indirectly  induced  by administrative  decisions  and  price  distortions  to
transfer  from countryside  to town  their  own resources,  thereby  reducing  the
social (but increasing  the private)  rate  of return  upon those  as well; and that,
ultimately,  inadequate  inputs  of rural  resources  substantially  reduced  even
the efficient use of urban  resources"  (Lipton  1977: 70-1).
Though  far  more  numerous  than  urban  populations,  rural  people  are  more
dispersed,  poor,  inarticulate  and  disorganized.  The  result  is  an  allocation  of
resources  between urban  and  rural  areas  that  is unfairly  biased  against  rural  areas
and is economically inefficient.  For example,  on average  in developing  countries  the
agriculture  sector employs  70 percent  of the  labor force and  generates  between  40-
45 percent  of GNP, yet it receives  less than  20 percent  of public  investment  and  has
been  induced  or  forced to contribute  considerably  more  to  public  savings  through
high levels of taxation.
Lipton, takes  the debate  one step  further  and  argues  that  an "urban  alliance"  is
forged between  urban  and  rural  elites  that  explains  much of the  inequality  within
rural  areas.  It  is  only  the  better-off  farmers,  who  produce  in  excess  of  their
consumption  needs  and  therefore  have  surpluses  available  for  transfer  to  urban
centers.  They  often  benefit  from  compensating  transfers,  in  the  form  of  price
support  and  production  subsidies  for fertilizer  and  credit.  The  implication  of this
alhiance is  that  surpluses  that  would  otherwise  have  been  available  for  local  RD
investments  are  consumed  by rural  elites  or  transferred  to urban  centers,  further
impoverishing  the rural  poor.
The  concomitant  lack  of investment  in  rural  areas  that  is  the  result  of  the
surplus  transfers  to cities  is manifested  in the  low level of services  provided  to  the
rural  poor.  The  general  tendency  within  rural  areas  is  for  services  to  be
concentrated  in local government  administrative  centers,  and for outlying  villages  to
have  to  accept  either  nonexistent  services-no  schools,  health  posts  or  extension
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agents,  or  a  level  of  service  that  is  wholly  inadequate  excessive  travel  times  to
reach  school,  infrequent  visits  by extension  agents.
A  special  issue  of  the  Journal  of  Development  Studies  (Varshney  1993)
reconsidered  the  question  of urban  bias.  Contributing  authors  argued  that  there  are
conditions  under  which  urban  bias  might  be  eroded,  and  several  country  examples
were  cited,  e.g.,  an  increase  in  the  variety  of political  institutions  offers  the  possi-
bility  for  rural  interests  to  be  represented  under  competitive  party  systems  (India,
Costa  Rica);  technical  change  through  sustained  growth  in  agriculture  may  begin  to
make  the  rural  sector  more  powerful,  as  its  contribution  to  economic  growth
expands  (C6te  d'Ivoire,  Cuba,  Costa  Rica,  China,  India);  ethnic,  religious  and  other
class  identities  may  cut  across  the  rural-urban  divide  (South  Korea,  Taiwan,  India).
It  is  clear  that  under  certain  specific  conditions,  particular  elements  of urban
bias  may  decline,  and  rural  forces  may  even  be successful  in  securing  a  redirection
of resources  to rural  areas,  e.g.,  in  Indonesia  where  a  significant  number  of farmers
have  benefited  from  public  resource  allocations.  Nevertheless,  as  Lipton  (1993)
points  out  in  a rejoinder  article,  specific  examples  taken  out  of context  do not  prove
that  the  rural  sector  has  ceased  being  discriminated  against,  and  if  a  wider
definition  of  urban  bias  is  considered  there  is  clear  evidence  of  the  tendency  for
urban  bias  to continue  to exist.
Excessive  Agricultural  Taxation
Incentive  policies  have  been  analyzed  in  a  five-volume  series,  summarized  in
Schiff  and  Vald6s  (1992).  They  examine  the  impact  of  trade  and  pricing
interventions  on  agricultural  incentives  in  eighteen  developing  countries  between
1960-85. They found that  discrimination-in  the form of overvalued  exchange  rates,
industrial  protection  and  direct  intervention  in  the  agriculture  sector-adversely
affected  both  agricultural  growth  and  overall  economic  development.
Schiff and  Vald6s present  a detailed  exposition  of the particular  types  of policies
utilized  by  governments  to  discriminate  against  agriculture.  This  analysis  leads  to
the  following  conclusions:
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*  All but  two of the countries  surveyed  (Republic of Korea  and  Portugal)  taxed
their  agricultural  sectors  during  the  period  studied.  Taxation  was  most
severe,  ranging  from 45-60 percent,  in the  three  African countries  sampled-
C6te d'Ivoire, Ghana  and Zambia; it was moderately  severe (25-45 percent)  in
Argentina,  Colombia,  Dominican  Republic,  Egypt,  Morocco,  Pakistan,
Philippines,  Sri Lanka,  Thailand  and Turkey;  and  it was relatively  low (8-22
percent)  in Brazil, Chile and Malaysia;
*  On  average,  three-quarters  of agricultural  taxation  derived  from  intdirect
measures,  mainly  overvalued  exchange  rates  and  industrial  protection;  only
one-quarter  derived from direct agricultural  policy measures.
*  Direct  interventions  generally  protected  food  crops  without  comparative
advantage,  e.g.,  wheat  in  Brazil,  and negatively  protected  export
commodities  with  a  large  comparative  advantage,  e.g.,  rice  in  Thailand,
cotton  in  Egypt,  coffee and  cocoa in  West  Africa  and  Latin  America.  The
combined  negative  impact  of direct  and  indirect  interventions  are  likely  to
have  severely  depressed  private  agricultural  investment  and  economic
growth3;
*  Public  investment  in agriculture  and  subsidies  for agricultural  inputs  aim to
provide  compensation  for the  negative  impact  of government  interventions.
However,  whether  by design  or  by properties  inherent  in  the  instruments
chosen  (e.g.,  credit  and  other  production  subsidies),  such  interventions
tended  to  benefit  large  farmers  and  "did  not  compensate,  or compensated
very  little,  for the  substantial  income outflows  resulting  from  interventions
in  output  markets4,  and  in most  cases,  public  investment  in  agriculture  did
not  compensate  for  the  negative  effects  of  price  interventions  ... In  sum:
government  and  the nonagricultural  sectors  were  the winners  in most cases,
and  agriculture  the loser" (Schiff and Valdes: 8); and
*  Differential  protection  and  negative  protection  of individual  commodities  led
to  significant  reallocations  within  the  agricultural  sector  that  were  not  in
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line  with  the  governments'  proclaimed  aims  of  food  security  and  poverty
reduction.  While  revenues  were  raised  and  prices  stabilized,  highly
inefficient  instruments  of  intervention  were  chosen  that  were  not  cost-
effective.
The  ideological  rationale  for  high  rates  of agricultural  taxation  was  grounded  in
the  widely-held  view  that  the  best  way  to  accelerate  economic  growth  was  through
urban  growth  and  encouragement  of rural-urban  migration.  These  views  have  been
thoroughly  discredited  and  many  developing  countries  have  reduced  levels  of
agricultural  taxation.  Nevertheless,  rural  areas  still  face  the  challenge  of mobiliAing
sufficient  resources  to fund  the  components  of RD.
Inadequate  Resource  Mobilization
It  is  difficult  to  mobilize  sufficient  resources  in  rural  areas  to  finance  the
components  of RD. Raising  taxes  is  more  difficult  in  rural  than  urban  locations,
because  taxation  reduces  already  low levels of rural  income.  Even where  this  is not
the case, the tax base  is usually  small. Also, due to a higher  level of self-sufficiency
in rural  communities,  trade  in taxable  goods and services is often limited.
In  any  case,  most  of  the  taxes  proposed  for  rural  areas  do  not  possess  the
desirable  characteristics  of an  appropriate  local  tax  as  identified  in  the  optimal
taxation  literature.  Bird  and  Wallich (1993) have argued  that  a local tax should  be
characterized  by:  (i)  the  presence  of a  fixed  tax  base  to  permit  location-specific
variation  in  tax  rates;  (ii)  a  visible  tax  base  to  ensure  accountability;  (iii)  a
perception  of the  tax  as  being  fair;  (iv) stable  tax  yields  that  are  not  eroded  by
inflation;  and  (v) tax  revenues  that  are  adequate  to  meet  needs  as  they  expand.
Despite  these  difficulties,  efforts  have been  made  to raise  rural  taxes.  Three  main
types of taxes have been used:
Agricultural  Commnodity Taxes.  In  the second  half of the  twentieth  century,
export  taxes  on  agricultural  commodities  have  been  the  single  most  important
source  of government  revenue  from  agriculture  and  rural  areas.  As  noted  in  the
Schiff  and  Vald6s  (1992)  study,  commodity  taxes  contributed  an  average  of  ten
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percent  of government  spending  between  1960-85.  The  revenues  from  export  taxes
accrued  to  central  governments,  however,  resulting  in  rural  communities  at  best
receiving  only  limited  direct  benefit  from  the  product  of their  own  labor,  and  often
receiving  no benefit  at  all.
Realizing  the  negative  incentive  effects  that  export  taxes  have  on  agricultural
producers,  developing  country  governments  have  tended  to  reduce  levels  of export
tax  over  the  past  few years.  These  types  of agricultural  taxes  are,  therefore,  unlikely
to provide  a  significant  contribution  to overall  revenues  in  the  future.
Agricultural  Land  Taxes.  Binswanger  et  al  (1993)  summarize  three  main
advantages  that  a land  tax has  over  a tax  on  agricultural  output  or  exports:  (i) it
has  minimal  disincentive  effects if the  tax is based  on the  potential  monetary  yield
of a certain  plot under  normal  conditions;  (ii) it facilitates  taxation  of the  domestic
subsistence  sector,  while  being  much  less  regressive  than  a  poll  tax;  and  (iii)
provided  the  tax base  is not  changed  too frequently,  a land  tax  will not  discourage
investment  in land improvements.
Although  land-based  taxes  are  considered  to  be  the  highest-yielding  tax
instruments  available  to  local  governments,  nowhere  in  the  world  have  land  and
property  taxes,  in both  rural  and  urban  areas,  taken  together  contributed  more than
ten  percent  of total  tax  revenue  (Bird and  Wallich  1993). Administering  land  taxes
effectively  and  equitably  requires  detailed  information  on land  size, value,  owner-
ship,  and  its  productive  capacity.  Even  in  the  few  developing  countries  that
maintain  a  sufficiently  detailed  cadastral  survey,  land  taxes  are  relatively
unimportant.  Often associated  with previous  extractive  colonial or military  regimes,
rural  land  taxes  typically  incur  high  political  costs  that  offset  any  revenue  gains.
Developing-country  governments  are  therefore  unlikely  to turn  to  land  taxes  as  a
major source of revenue  for rural  areas.
User  Charges  and  Fees.  The  use  of user  charges  and  fees  as  potential  sources
of additional  local resources  has  received  considerable  recent  attention  (Bahl  and
Linn  1992), not  so  much  as  mechanisms  to  boost  overall  local  revenues,  but  to
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earmark  revenues  to ensure  a sufficient  level of resources  is available  to finance  at
least  the  operation  and  maintenance  (O&M) costs  of infrastructure  projects,  and
preferably  the capital  costs also.
In Indonesia,  for example,  important  reforms  of health  service pricing  have been
initiated  (Shah  and  Qureshi  1994). Fees  for health  services  have  been  doubled  in
some districts,  and  rather  than  a fall in  service utilization  because  of higher  prices,
utilization  has risen  in response  to better  service delivery.  As a result  some districts
are now fully covering their  O&M costs.
At the village level the contribution  of user charges  and fees to revenues  could be
significant,  and  there  is evidence  that  fees could be increased  in  many  developing
countries  (Bahl and  Linn  1992). Nevertheless,  it is unlikely  that  these  fees would be
sufficient  to make  a significant  increase  in the  overall level of resources  available  to
rural  communities.
Rural  areas,  thus,  face a dual problem of having an  insufficient  resource  base to
generate  resources,  while,  at  the  same  time,  having  to  meet  excessive  levels  of
taxation  levied by central  governments.  Although  the literature  on optimal  taxation
and  urban  bias provide a basis  for understanding  why agricultural  growth  has  been
stifled and  rural  poverty remains  pervasive,  no explanation  has  been given as to the
rnotiuation  of urban  elites  nor  the  mecharnisms  used  by  them  to  maintain  their
dominance, i.e., the political economy of rural  areas  is not considered.
Political  Economy
Rural  and  urban  interests  in  developing  countries  are  articulated  differently
through  the  political  process.  Binswanger  and  Deininger  (1995) note  the  difficulty
faced by rural  communities  in organizing  for collective action.  Olson (1971) suggests
three  factors in particular  that  may contribute  to the low ability of rural  populations
in developing countries  to articulate  their political  demands.
First,  together  with  the  ability  to overcome  the  free-rider  problem  and  enforce
rules,  the cost of organization  and cornmunication  determine  the "pressure"  function
of different  groups  in  an  otherwise  undistorted,  perfect-information  and  risk-free
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environment.  Spatial  dispersion,  heterogeneity,  and  lack  of  policing  and
enforcement  capacity  reduce  the efficiency of pressure  production  in  rural  areas  in
developing  countries.  Note  that  the  highly  concentrated  production  of  specific
agricultural  commodities  may provide a  good opportunity  for farmers  in  developed
countries  to increase  their  political  voice (Olson 1985)5.
Second,  any  redistribution  of  income  will  be  resisted  by  losers.  Under  the
assumption  of  decreasing  marginal  utility  of  wealth  such  resistance  would  be
greater  the  higher  the  amount  of resources  available  to  be redistributed.  Efficient
instruments  that  minimize  the  social losses  associated  with  income  redistribution
will increase  the  amount  of resources  that  can be obtained  for any  unit  of pressure.
Education  and  itformational  status  affect  the  ability:  (i) to  identify  efficient
redistributive  instruments;  (ii) to  evaluate  the  effect  of any  given  instrument  on
own wealth;  and  (iii) to spread  systematic  misinformation  about  the  impact  of any
given  instrument.  All  three  elements  would  bias  redistribution  in  favor  of
individuals  with  higher  education,  putting  peasants  at  a  disadvantage.
Furthermore,  with  non-zero  cost  of  information  acquisition-and  the  ability  of
interest  groups  to  use  obfuscating  instruments  of  redistribution  or  even  spread
misinformation  that  fits  preconceived ideological notions-it  may be rational  for the
average  rural  voter  to  remain  uninformed  (Brock et  al  1989) and  therefore  not  to
resist  redistribution  that  puts  him or her at a personal  disadvantage.
Third,  "investment"  in  political  pressure  or  rent-seeking  activities  is extremely
risky  and  yields  results  only  with  a  long  lag.  Individuals  would  engage  in  rent-
seeking  only  if  other  investment  opportunities  with  similar  expected  return  are
unavailable.  The  expected  return  from  rent-seeking  increases  with  the  ability  to
obtain  insurance  either  through  markets  for  insurance,  credit,  access  to  non-
covariate  income, or via self-insurance  provided  by own wealth.  High covariance  of
agricultural  income  risks  (Binswanger  and  Rosenzweig  1986)  makes  insurance
particularly  difficult  for  the  rural  poor.  If  these  risks  are  unmitigated,  they  will
severely  limit  the  ability of small  peasants  to devote resources  to the  production  of
political influence.
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Bates  (1983)  uses  collective  action  variables  to  explain  African  agricultural
policies.  In addition  to the  superior  collective action  potential  of large  farmers,  he
also  takes  into account  their  ability  to form coalitions  with  strategically  important
sections  of the  population.  Alliances  between  industrialists,  urban  consumers  and
large  farmers  can  explain  policy  regimes  that  tax  a  broad  range  of agricultural
products,  favor  industry  and  attempt  to  compensate  for  such  biases  against
agriculture  through  selective  subsidies  on  agricultural  inputs  that  benefit  large
farms.
Historically,  the  fact  that  poor  rural  people  have  borne  the  brunt  of  taxation
suggests  that  a  view  of  policy  determination  as  a  bargaining  process  among
different  interest  groups  may  be appropriate.  The main  effect of different  political
decision-making  mechanisms  is to alter  both the costs of political  articulation  and of
changing  governments.
The growing literature  on the  political  economy of rent-seeking  (Krueger  1974,
Posner  1975, Tullock  1984) provides  some  insights  into  the  interactions  that  take
place  between  the  various  interested  groups  that  result  in  governments
implementing  policies that  discriminate  against  rural  areas.
Becker  (1983 and  1985) specifies  a general  model in  which  the  representative
member  of a group  maximizes  his or her  utility  by spending  resources  on political
activity  (lobbying)  to  produce,  according  to  a  given  production  function,  political
pressure  that  will make  politicians  assess  taxes  and/or  subsidies  to produce private
and public goods in a way that  is favorable  to him.
Under  the  assumptions  that  interest  groups  and  their  "pressure  production
function"  are exogenously  given, that  information  is perfect,  that  politicians  act  as
impartial  arbitrators,  and  that  voting  is  costless,  differences  in  the  pressure
production  function  drive  the  political  economy  model  and  become  important  in
explaining  actual  policy outcomes.  Of particular  interest  is the  result  that,  if power
is equally  distributed,  i.e., all groups have access to the same technology of pressure
production,  the  compensation  principle  will  hold  and  gainers  could  compensate
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losers.  Investment  would be made only in  socially beneficial  (public)  goods. Even if
there  are  differences  in  the  power  distribution,  it  can  be  shown  that  for  any
distribution  of power,  the  most  "efficient"  method  of redistribution  will be chosen,
because  deadweight  losses  increase  more  than  proportionately  to  the  amount
transferred.  Given  the  observed  redistribution  of resources  away  from  the  rural
poor,  Becker's  theory  suggests  that  rural  people  have  a  very  low  capacity  to
articulate  their  demands  in the political  arena.
A number  of applications  of the conflict between  different  interest  groups  have
been applied  to agriculture.  Hayami  and  Anderson  (1986) have  developed  a theory
of supply  and  demand  for agricultural  protection,  which  integrates  elements  from
the  theories  of public  choice  and  collective  action,  that  explains  the  widespread
practice  in  developed  countries  of  subsidizing  small  agricultural  sectors  at  the
expense of consumers.  They argue  that  at  low levels of development  neither  supply
nor demand  for agricultural  protection  is high.  Therefore,  the agricultural  sector is
taxed  in order  to subsidize  urban  workers  and  industrialists  via low food prices. At
higher  levels of development,  the  demand  and  supply  curves  for agricultural  protec-
tion  shift  to  the right.  Consumers  no longer  spend  a  large  part  of their  budget  on
food and,  given that  returns  to farming  do not rise  fast enough  to facilitate  farmers'
participation  in  general  growth,  agriculturists-who  now  face  lower  costs  of
organization-lobby  for protection.  This  provides  one  possible  explanation  of why
urban  bias  in  developing  countries  transforms  into  rural  bias  in  developed
countries.  The study  does not, however,  explain  the distribution  of gains  and  losses
within  the  agricultural  sector.  It  also  appears  to  be  at  odds  with  some  of  the
historical  evidence,  and with  the fact that  agricultural  protection  does not  appear  to
be linked to relatively  low growth in agricultural  productivity.
Gardner  (1987)  provides  an  empirical  illustration  of  the  importance  of  the
factors  facilitating  collective  action.  His  econometric  analysis  of  US  data  for  17
commodities  from  1910  to  the  present,  provides  quantitative  support  for  the
predictions  of the collective action model outlined  above.
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STRATEGIES FOR RURAL DEVELOPMENT
In  the  post-war  period,  concern  over  the  high  level  of rural  poverty  led  donor
agencies  to develop specific interventions  aimed  at rural  areas.  Ruttan  (1984) gives
a  history  of these  initiatives,  the  most  recent  of which  was  the  integrated  rural
development  (IRD) model. Through  its  Area  Development  Projects,  the World Bank
(WB) attempted  to  target  the  rural  poor  by  providing  a  detailed,  multi-sectoral
package  for RD. However, poor project performance  and  the failure  to bring  about  a
sustained  improvement  in  the  living standards  of rural  people  led to  a significant
reduction  in the number  of ADPs and  the abandonment  of the  "blueprint"  approach
to RD.
With the failure  of IRD, the WB has  been left without  a specific policy aimed  at
poor rural  areas.  Yet  the need for one has  never been  greater.  The failure  of donor
agencies  to confront  the  central  challenge  of RD-namely  to tackle  the  complexity
associated  with  providing  a  range  of  local  goods  and  services  that  local  people
demand-is  likely  to render  RD initiatives  ineffective.  Greater  decentralization  of
power and  authority  to lower-level governments  and  communities  may provide one
mechanism  through  which the complexity issue may be addressed.
Integrated  Rural  Development
A policy  paper  prepared  by  the  WB (World  Bank  1974) defined  RD as:  "...a
growth  strategy  for  a  particular  target  population-the  rural  poor.  It  involves
extending  the benefits  of development  to those  whose futures  lie in the  pursuit  of a
livelihood in  rural  areas".  The RD strategy  developed  by the  WB during  the  1970s
was  based  on  an  integrated  approach  aimed  at  tackling  rural  poverty6. IRD
programs  typically  contained  similar  components  and  emphasized  increased
agricultural  productivity  as  the  basis  for raising  rural  incomes,  while  recognizing
the  synergistic  contribution  of better  education,  health  and  other  basic services  to
further  improvements  in  people's  quality  of  life  and  their  overall  productivitv.
Project initiatives  tried  to achieve synergism  between  the  various  elements  by using
an integrated  or "central  planning"  approach  to local development.
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The  WB's  vehicle  for  implementing  IRD  was  through  Area  Development
Projects.  The  particular  advantage  of  these  schemes  was  perceived  to  be  the
opportunity  to focus directly  on the  needs  of the  rural  poor through  diversified  crop
and  integrated  farming  systems  linked  to  training,  social  services  and  rural
infrastructure  projects.  Projects  were  sometimes  based  on  single  agricultural
products  accompanied  by other  services that  received  a much  smaller  proportion  of
project funds,  e.g., tea in  Kenya, cotton  in Mali or coffee in  Papua  New Guinea,  but
usually  included  broader  approaches  that  had  a  more balanced  lending  across  the
sectors,  e.g.,  the series  of RD programs  in northeastern  Brazil,  the PIDER  projects
in  Mexico, the  Lilongwe  Land  Development  Program  in  Malawi,  and  three  WB-
financed  RD projects  in Sri Lanka.
Difficulties  with  project  implementation  emerged  early  on.  Government  line
agencies  were  perceived  as  inefficient,  technically  incompetent,  understaffed  and
philosophically  conservative.  Dissatisfaction  with  their  performance  as  program
implementing  agencies  led  administrators  to  advocate  the  creation  of  new,
autonomous  implementation  units  designed  to by-pass  the  line  agencies.  However,
experience  suggests  that  "[al1most nowhere  have  these  new  administrative  units
been able  to survive  in  the local political  and  bureaucratic  establishment"  (Lacroix
1985:  20),  and  they  function  only  as  long  as  they  have  the  financial  and
administrative  backing of an external  aid agency.
Financial  arrangements  for  implementing  RD  were  also  problematic  and
characterized  by excessive  delays  in  the  release  of funds  and  lack  of counter-part
funding  from  local  agencies,  both  of  which  severely  retarded  project
implementation.  In the  POLONORDESTE  RD projects  in  northeastern  Brazil,  for
example,  project  funding  relied  on annual  central  government  budgets.  The result
was that  funding  varied  significantly  from year  to year  and  the  method  of releasing
funds was complicated  and protracted.
Sub-projects  for RD are  usually  small,  often  quite  simple,  and  always  widely
dispersed.  Central  planning  for hundreds  of differentiated  projects  and  localities  is
likely to fail because  of the location-specificity of conditions  and  needs.  Although  RD
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projects  did often complete a significant  amount  of infrastructure,  they did poorly on
other  components  because  systems  were  not able to handle  the complexity  of multi-
agency, multi-project  coordination  associated  with  a centrally  planned  and  executed
effort.  As  WB project  evaluation  reports  amply  document,  the  desired  synergism
was not achieved, and by the mid- 1980s disappointment  with  RD performance  led to
the development  of a coherent  critique  of the IRD approach.
Failure  of Integrated  Rural  Development
Apart  from  the  operational  difficulties  associated  with  institutional  and
financial  design,  a more serious  critique  of the  IRD model began  to emerge  in  the
mid-1970s. The limited  focus of RD projects  on increasing  agricultural  productivity;
the  insufficient  attention  paid  to  the  wider  context  of  national  macroeconomic
policy; the failure  to develop technological packages  that  were  sufficiently  flexible to
deal  with  local conditions;  the  lack  of attention  to  sociocultural  and  institutional
factors;  and  the  scarcity  of trained  local manpower  were  all cited  by Lele  (1979) as
major issues constraining  the effectiveness  of RD programs.
Ruttan  (1975) identifies  the  difficulty  of scaling-up  from  successful  RD pilot
projects  to the  regional  or national  level as the  result  of not  being able to  maintain
the  intensity  of  human  resources  devoted  to  organization,  management  and
technical  assistance.  "Furthermore,  access  to  the  higher  decision-making  levels  of
government  and  the  administrative  freedom  to  tailor  programs  precisely  to  local
conditions  are frequently  sacrificed to administrative  convenience when  projects  are
generalized.  Highly  centralized  administration  of  national  programs  makes  it
difficult  to carry  out  the  experiments  with  program  content  and  delivery  methods
that  are  essential  if rural  development  programs  are  to meet  the  diverse  needs  of
rural  areas"  (Ruttan  1975: 15).
Increasing  concern  with  RD performance  led WB to undertake  its  own  review
(World Bank  1987). Based  on an  in-depth  analysis  of completed  project  reports,  a
range of problems were identified:
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*  Adverse  policy  environment:  It  quickly  became  apparent  that  IRD
projects,  when  pursued  in  an  adverse  policy  environment  for  agriculture
were  unlikely  to  succeed.  Reform  of the  policy  environment  was  seen  as  a
prior  condition  for  success.  The  greater  success  rate  of IRD  projects  in  Asia
compared  to  Latin  America  and  Africa  supports  this  diagnosis.
*  Lack  of government  conmuitment:  Often  governments  did  not  provide  the
counterpart  funding  required  for  implementation  of  the  programs,  to  the
entire  programs  or  to  vital  components  thereof,  despite  assurances  given  in
negotiations.
*  Lack  of  appropriate  technology:  This  proved  important  in  unirrigated
areas,  especially  of Africa,  where  there  was  no history  of past  commitment  to
agricultural  research,  or  where  colonial  research  efforts  had  decayed.  An
early  remedy  was  to  include  project-specific  research  components,  most  of
which  failed  and,  in  addition,  undermined  the  national  agricultural  research
systems  by robbing  them  of talented  researchers.
*  Neglect  of institutional  development:  By setting  up project  coordination
units,  sometimes  staffed  by  expatriates,  and  using  central  or  regional
government  line  agencies,  the  development  of  local  and  district  level
institutional  capacity  to  plan,  execute  and  monitor  rural  development  was
neglected,  and sometimes  seriously  undermined.
*  Lack of beneficiary  participation:  The programs  were often designed  in a
top-down approach  within  which  beneficiaries  were  not  given any  authority
for  decision-making  or  program  execution.  Even  if  they  were  consulted  in
advance,  they  could  not  be  sure  that  their  preferences  were  being  given
adequate  weight.  Most often  they  therefore  chose  the  only  decision  making
option they had, voting with  their  feet.
*  The  complexity  or  coordination  problem:  It  is  ironic  that  complexity
should  have  become the Achilles  heel of RD. After  all,  building  rural  roads,
small  scale  infrastructure  or  providing  agricultural  extension  must  be
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dramatically  simpler  tasks  than  the  construction  of  largescale  irrigation
infrastructure  or  ports,  where  donors  did  not  encounter  a  coordination
problem.  The coordination  problem emerged  as  a consequence  of delegating
subprogram  execution  to government  bureaucracies  or parastatals  that  were
typically  highly centralized  and had  their  own objectives. Many of them  were
out  of touch  with  beneficiaries,  who could have coordinated  relatively  simple
tasks  at  the  local level  much  more easily.  At  the  community  level,  project
implementation  is  often  quite  straightforward  and  information  is  readily
available  to local decision-makers.
While  the  critiques  of IRD offer valuable  insights  and  suggestions  for change,
they suffer from a problem of over-generalization  and a tendency  to concentrate  only
on aspects  of programs  that  did not work. In reality,  each RD project  was a complex
of successes  and failures,  as is demonstrated  in Judith  Tendler's  detailed  analytical
review of the northeastern  RD projects in Brazil (World Bank  1993).
Tendler  highlights  features  of the  RD process  that  worked  in  Brazil,  often  in
spite of rather  than  because  of the design  of the  official RD program.  In particular,
she  demonstrates  the  central  role  played  by  fiscal  issues  in  implementing  RD
programs.  Against  a backdrop of severe fiscal austerity  at the time the projects  were
being  implemented  in  Brazil,  additional  resources  were  mobilized  by  a  variety  of
agencies  above  and  beyond  those  expected  at  appraisal.  "A considerable  part  of
these  additional  resources  came  through  municipal  governments.  Yet they  had  no
formal role  in the  Northeast  projects  because  they  are  typically  seen  as  bankrupt,
clientalistic,  and  technically  inadequate,.. .The way in which  the municipalities  were
drawn  into  resource  mobilization,  moreover,  transformed  them  into  a  source  of
healthy  outside  pressure  on state agencies to behave  accountably,  get things  carried
out  on  time,  keep  costs  down,  and  use  less  sophisticated  and  capital  intensive
standards.  Bank  staff  had  tried,  often  to  no avail,  to  accomplish  the  same  thing."
(World Bank  1993: xxii).
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New Opportunities  for Rural  Development
The failure  of IRD left experts  interested  in rural  poverty  reduction  in  disarray.
The WB has  retreated  from the  ambitious  agenda  of the  1970s into  the  support  of
more  traditional  sector-specific  programs  or projects,  each  dealing  with  a  specific
component  of RD, such  as agricultural  extension,  smallscale  irrigation,  rural  roads,
primary  education  or  health  care,  etc.  This  means  that  support  for rural  poverty
reduction  has  become highly  selective  within  the  WB's program  as  nowhere  has  it
been  possible  to  support  the  full  array  of  interventions  that  are  required  for
successful  rural  poverty reduction.
The worst  consequence  of the  failure  has  been  the  inability  of donors  to assist
count.ries  with  advice  on  policies  and  programs  that  would  enable  them  to
implement  successfully  RD  programs  and  reduce  rural  poverty.  Policy  advice
rightfully  concentrates,  inter alia,  on  eliminating  direct  and  indirect  distortions,
supporting  infrastructure  and  social  investment  in  rural  areas  and  for  the  poor,
implementing  land  reform,  reducing  interventions  via  parastatals,  strengthening
agricultural  research  and  extension.  However, the question  of how to implement  the
investment  and  support  strategies  that  are  recommended  for  rural  areas  is  left
unanswered.  By withdrawing  from an  integrated  approach  to RD, donors  have left
the  complexity  and  other  implementation  problems  in  the  hands  of the  country
governments.  They  have  not  disappeared  just  because  the  donor  community  has
withdrawn  from them.
Furthermore,  the  observations  made  in  WB's  1974 RD  report  concerning  the
justification  for an  integrated  approach  to RD remain:  "Basically,  arguments  in its
[area development]  favor stem from consideration  of the often complex nature  of the
target  group  situation,  which  calls  for  specific  programs  locally  prepared  and
tailored to local conditionts" (World Bank  1974: 27, italics  added).
The  fallacy  of  the  policy  response  has  been  to  assume  that  the  complexity
associated  with  RD is simply a planning  issue  that  can be dealt  with  through  having
smaller,  single-sector  projects.  Thus,  the  response  to the  criticisms  of IRD projects
has  been partial,  sidestepping  rather  than  confronting  the  issue  of complexity,  and
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giving  insufficient  attention  to  structural  problems  that  limit  the  effectiveness  of
desirable  policy reforms.  It  has  not  been fully recognized  that,  at a  local level,  the
coordination  issues  are often less  complex  and  transparent  than  at a  central  level,
and  that  local  institutions  may  have  the  information,  incentives  and  ability  to
achieve the desired  synergism.
Ruttan  (1984)  is  one  of the  few  writers  to  have  highlighted  the  lack  of any
sustained  effort  as  part  of RD projects  to develop local  government.  He  highlights
the failure  "to understand  the  difference between  decentralized  administration  and
decentralized  governance-between  locating  the  administrative  offices  of  centre
ministries  at  the provincial  or district  level  and  the  strengthening  of the fiscal  and
administrative  capacity  of local government"  (Ruttan  1984: 395).
Facing the  complexity issues  associated  with  RD on their  own, some developing
countries  have  developed  new policies  and  programs  that  attempt  to build  on the
positive  features  of  an  integrated  approach.  These  programs  address  the
coordination  problem  through  processes  of  decentralization  that  grant  greater
decision-making  autonomy  to local-level institutions.
DECENTRALIZATION
The interest  in decentralization  as a mechanism  for transforming  society is not
new.  Cohen  et  al  cite  nineteenth-century  discussions  between  Lemennais,  who
characterized  an  over-centralized  state  as  "apoplexy at  the center  and  paralysis  at
the  extremities",  and  Dupont-White,  who argued  that  "the  centralized  state  is  the
best  instrument  to destroy  unfair  and  unproductive  caste  and  privilege  and  smash
the hold of local elites  in the countryside"  (1981: 3).
In  the  second-half  of  the  twentieth  century,  practically  every  country  has
experimented  with  some  form of decentralization  or local government  reform  with
varying  aims  and  outcomes  (Cheema  and  Rondinelli  1983 review  decentralization
initiatives  of the  1970s; Campbell  et  al review  recent  Latin  American  experience).
The  present  level  of interest  in  decentralization  is pervasive,  and  Dillinger  notes
that  "out of 75 developing  and  transitional  countries  with  populations  greater  than
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5 million,  all but  12 claim to be embarked  on some for of transfer  of political  power
to local units  of government"  (1994: 8).
There  have,  however,  been  a  number  of recent  developments  that  distinguish
the  present  wave  of  decentralization  from  earlier  attempts.  First,  democratic
institutions  have been established  and/or  their  role extended  in  many countries.  In
Latin  America,  in particular,  military  regimes  have been replaced  by elected  civilian
governments,  and  local  government  officials-mayors  and  council  members-
previously  appointed  are now elected.
Second,  most  of the  countries  presently  involved  in  decentralization  initiatives
recognize  the  importance  of  providing  financial  resources  to  decentralized
institutions  to permit  them  to  carry  out  their  powers  and  responsibilities.  Lack of
adequate  funding  for lower-level institutions  was  the  single  most  important  factor
that  undermined  many of the  decentralization  attempts  of the  1970s (Cheema  and
Rondinelli  1983).
Third,  there  is a growing realization  that  many types  of institutions  can actively
participate  in  decentralization  efforts.  There  has  been  widespread  privatization  of
services  that  can  be  delivered  on  a  commercial  basis.  In  addition,  it  has  been
recognized that  NGOs and  community-level  organizations  have a significant  role to
play  in  improving  service  delivery  and  for  providing  improved  mechanisms  for
targeting  disadvantaged  groups.
These  developments  are likely  to enlarge  considerably  the  scope for overcoming
some of the  major  factors  that  undermined  earlier  decentralization  efforts,  and  to
improve  the  prospects  for  sustaining  decentralization  initiatives  once  they  have
been established.
Defining  Decentralization
The terminology  most often used  to discuss  decentralization  is that  proposed  by
Rondinelli  (1981),  who  distinguishes  between  four  different  categories  of
decentralization:  (i) deconcentration  is  defined  as  a  transfer  of  power  to  local
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administrative  offices of the  central  government;  (ii) delegatton  is  the  transfer  of
power to subnational  governments  and/or parastatals,  or other  government  entities;
(iii) deuoluttion  is  the  transfer  of  power  to  subnational  political  entities;  and
(iv) privatization  is the transfer  of power to the private  sector.
Deconcentration.  The  "training  and  visit"  (T&V)  system  of  agricultural
extension  provides  a  good example  of deconcentration  of responsibility.  Developed
during  the  1960s, the  T&V system  aimed  to address  criticisms  of existing  extension
arrangements.  In  India,  the  T&V system  was  introduced  state  by state,  replacing
the system  of multipurpose  village-level  workers.  Under  the T&V system,  staff  deal
only with extension  work. They are organized  into a unified extension  service with  a
single  line  of command,  but  still  under  the  state-level  Ministry  of  Agriculture.
Extension  work  tasks  are  precisely  defined  and  systematic  visits  to  target  farmers
are undertaken.
Feder  and  Slade  (1986)  estimated  a  rate  of  return  of  15  percent  on  the
incremental  investments  in  T&V  in  India,  indicating  overall  success  as  far  as
productive  resources  are concerned.  Other  studies,  outlined  in  Hulme  (1992), give
more mixed results.  Questions  have been raised concerning  the ability  of the  system
to reflect  adequately  and  respond  to  the needs  of farmers.  Poor research-extension
linkages7 and  a lack  of performance-related  incentives  for extension  workers  have
also undermined  the system.
These  criticisms  suggest  that  deconcentration  is  an  incomplete  strategy  for
decentralization.  Although  the  T&V  system  appears  to  provide  improved
mechanisms  for transferring  information  to farmers,  the  farmers  themselves  do not
possess  overall  decision-making  power.  Thus,  although  deconcentrating  power  to
local  administrative  offices  has  improved  the  governmental  organization  of
extension  services, the impact  of the T&V system  in terms  of being more responsive
to farmers'  needs  has been more limited.
Delegation.  Between  1975 and  1987, the Brazilian  government  implemented  22
IRD projects  in  the  ten  states  of Northeast  Brazil.  Both  the  Federal  and  State
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governments  had  responsibility  for project  organization  for the  two  generations  of
projects:  POLONORDESTE  (Program  of Integrated  Development  for the  Northeast)
and  PAPP (Program  of Assistance  to the  Small  Farmer).  To provide a  focus on the
northeastern  projects  and  to  enable  some  decentralization  of decision-making  the
government  established  SUDENE  (the Northeast  Regional  Development  Agency) as
a parastatal  with  overall  responsibility  for annual  project  planning,  budgeting  and
M&E. Actual  project implementation,  however,  was the responsibility  of the  States.
There  was  a  complex  approval  system  for  funding  transfers  and  authorizing
changes  in  project  design  that  required  the  approval  of  SUDENE,  WB  and
sometimes  the relevant  ministry  at the federal  level.
Not being well-integrated  into the  pre-existing  institutional  structures  in Brazil,
SUDENE  became  at  least  irrelevant  and  more  often  a  hindrance  to  project
implementation.  Although  it  was  an  institution  designed  to  focus  on  a  single
important  element  of the government's  development  strategy,  the hoped  for benefits
of  decentralizing  project  administration  to  a  parastatal  were  not  realized.  The
recent  reformulation  of  the  northeast  RD  programs  undertaken  by  WB  has
recognized the  inappropriate  role of SUDENE  in program  implementation  and  has
turned  over  most  of  its  program  responsibilities  to  the  States.  As  with
deconcentration,  delegation  appears  also not to be sufficient  on its own to guarantee
improved RD outcomes.
Devolution.  In the  post-independence  constitution  in  India,  states  were  given
strong  powers to administer  their  own development  programs.  The constitution  also
required  elections  at  the  village  and  district  levels  for  local  governments-the
Panchayati  Raj.  However,  decisions  concerning  the  assignment  of  functions  and
resource  transfers  to  these  local  governments  remained  at  the  state  level.  Most
states  starved  these  local governments  of resources  and  let  the electoral  process  at
the village and  district  level break  down.
In  the  1980s, state  governments  in  West  Bengal  and  Karnataka  revived  the
Panchayati  Raj system  and  mandated  district  elections  to councils at  village, block
and  district  levels.  To make  this  poLitical decision  meaningful  in  practice,  elected
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councils  were  given  substantial  authority  and  resource  allocations  to  decide  their
own  development  spending.  Although  opposed  initially  by  the  state  bureaucracies,
devolution  has  produced  a  system  which  was  patently  more  responsive  to  the  felt
needs  of people  at  the  village  level.
Devolution  may  include  elements  of both  deconcentration  and  delegation,  but  it
goes  beyond  these  decentralization  strategies  by recognizing  the  important  role  that
political  and  fiscal  control  plays  in better  satisfying  the  demands  of the  beneficiaries
of RD.
Privatization.  In  response  to  criticisms  of poor  service  delivery  from  publicly-
owned  institutions,  and  to fiscal crises  in  many  developing  countries,  governntents
have embarked  on programs  of privatizing  services  associated  with  RD. A series  of
papers  Umali  (1992), Umali  et  al (1992), Jaffee  and  Srivastava  (1992) and  Umali
and  Schwartz  (1994)  have  investigated  the  appropriate  role  of  the  private  and
public  sectors  for  agricultural  research,  livestock  services,  seed  production  and
distribution  and agricultural  extension  respectively.
With  regard  to  agricultural  extension,  for  example,  there  are  now  numerous
instances  where  the  private  sector  has  become  involved  in  service  provision  that
was previously  managed  by the public  sector.  These  include  agro-processing  firms,
input  suppliers,  farmers  associations,  media  companies  and  consulting  firms.
Farmer  associations  for vegetables  in  Turkey  and  Uganda,  poultry  in  Thailand,
tobacco and cotton in Zimbabwe, dairy products  in India  have all become involved in
providing  extension  and  other  services  to  farmers.  These  institutions  are  likely  to
reflect  better  the wishes  of beneficiary  farmers  else they will not  be able  to survive
commercially.  However,  there  are concerns  about  the  selective  participation  of the
private  sector,  especially  as it is likely  to operate  only in  areas  where  the  economic
returns  to  delivery  are  sufficient.  This  will  necessitate  a  continued  role  for  the
public sector in providing agricultural  services.
The Rondinelli  terminology  is useful  for describing  processes  of decentralization
and  for distinguishing  differing  types  of sectoral  arrangements  where,  given  the
22Decentralization:  The  Way Forward  for  Rural  Development?
different  nature  of  goods  and  services  provided,  different  combinations  of
deconcentration,  delegation,  devolution  and privatization  will be required.
Besides  the  Rondinelli  terminology,  a  further  analytical  refinement  can  be
discerned  in the literature  between  the political,  fiscal  and  institutiotnal  dimensions
of decentralization.  The examples  cited  above of different  types  of decentralization
indicate  how easy  it  is  to  undermine  one  type  of decentralization  by  not  giving
sufficient  attention  to  other  elements  of  decentralization.  For  example,  the
Panchayati  Raj experiments  in  India  failed  to decentralize  fiscal  resources  to  local
institutions,  effectively rendering  useless  the  attempt  to devolve political  power  on
its  own.  In  Brazil,  failure  to  consider  existing  institutional  arrangement  left
SUDENE  isolated  and irrelevant  to the decentralization  process.
In  most  of  the  literature  to  date,  however,  emphasis  given  to  these  broader
political,  fiscal  and  institutional  elements  of decentralization  has  been  segmented
according  to  different  disciplines.  Thus,  political  scientists  have  stressed  the
political  components  of decentralization  and  underplayed  the  other  dimensions;  the
public  choice  literature  has  focused  on  fiscal  issues;  and  the  institutional
dimensions  of decentralization  have often  been  given insufficient  attention,  due  to
the  difficulty  associated  with  characterizing  the  role  that  NGOs  and  other
community-based  organizations  might play in decentralization.  The result  is that  no
framework  has  been identified  that  assesses  all  the dimensions  of decentralization
and their  interlinkages.
Political  Decentralization
As  the  political  dimensions  of  decentralization  are  generally  concerned  with
increasing  public  participation  through  citizens'  active  engagement  in  public
institutions,  aU  programs  of  decentralization  require  formal  government
commitment  to initiate  the  process.  As Arthur  Lewis observed  almost  thirty  years
ago,  "[t]he  chief  obstacle  to  further  decentralization  is  political"  (1967).  If  the
overriding  political  environment  is  not  conducive  to  reform,  decentralization  is
unlikely  to  be  on  a  government's  agenda.  As  Harris  notes  in  his  review  of
decentralization  in  Latin  America  in  the  1970s,  "[blecause  of  the  dominant
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centralizing  tendency  and  premature  bureaucratization  of  the  Latin  American
political  systems,  the  prospects  in  general  are  not  very  favorable  for  the  successful
implementation  of  forms  of  political  and  administrative  decentralization  that  are
based  on  the  devolution  of power  from  the  national  to the  local  level"  (1983:  198).
The  importance  of the  overall  political  environment  can  be  seen  in  subsequent
decentralization  initiatives  that  have  been  introduced  in  many  Latin  American
countries  following  the  transition  from  autocratic  to  democratic  forms  of
government  that  took  place  during  the  1980s.  Political  transition  provided  a  window
of  opportunity  to  introduce  important  constitutional  reforms  that  permitted  the
introduction  of  more  decentralized  systems  of  government  in  Argentina  (World
Bank  1990),  Chile  (World  Bank  1992b),  Colombia  (World  Bank  1989),  and
Venezuela  (World  Bank  1992a).
Crook  and  Manor's  (1994,  hereafter  C&M)  comparative  analysis  of  decen-
tralization  in  South  Asia  and  West  Africa  is one  of the  most  thorough  recent  reviews
of  decentralization.  Governments  in  Bangladesh,  Cote  d'Ivoire,  Ghana  and  the
Indian  state  of  Karnataka  all  committed  themselves  to  introducing  systems  of
democratic  decentralization.  It  was  hoped  that  by bringing  decision-making  closer  to
communities  and  encouraging  their  direct  involvement  in  the  political  process,  the
prospects  for  sustained  RD  would  be  significantly  enhanced.  Political
decentralization  was  therefore  associated  with  the  devolution  of  specified  powers
and  responsibilities  from  central  government  to  lower-level  political  entities.
However,  the  motivation  and  aims  of  central  governments  in  devolving  political
power  can  vary  widely.  In  the  Indian  state  of Karnataka,  a  state  government  in
opposition  to  the  national  government  wanted  to  demonstrate  that  it  was  more
imaginative  and  democratic  than  its  rival  to  promote  its  fortunes  nationally,  and
hoped  to  develop  grassroots  support  by  putting  in  place  a  system  of locally  elected
councils  (C&M).
Ironically,  giving  life  to  local  political  institutions  may  increase  the  opportunity
for  collusion  between  locally-based  elites  and  the  center.  This  is  the  political
legitimization  of  the  "urban  alliance"  Lipton  refers  to  in  his  description  of  urban
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bias,  and  will likely  lead  to a worse outcome  for rural  populations.  In  Bangladesh,
for  example,  the  Ershad  regime  hoped  to  gain  control  of  decentralized,  elected
councils by making  sub-district  council Chairmen  dependent  on patronage  from  the
center  (C&M).
Understanding  the  underlying  intent  of  central  government  is  therefore  an
important  first  step  in  analyzing  decentralization  initiatives.  In  turn,  this  intent
will be conditioned  by the  historical  economic, social and  political  antecedents  of a
particular  country.  Thus,  in  the  case  of C6te d'Ivoire,  the  centralizing  tendency  of
the  French  colonial  administrative  system  combined  with  traditional  social
structures  that  recognized  the  work of local elites  according  to their  efforts  to help
their  own home towns led to a decentralized  system  characterized  by greater  rather
than lesser  dependency  on the center  (C&M).
If  we  adopt  the  view  that  political  decentralization  is  associated  with  the
devolution  of  power  to  subnational  political  entities,  it  is  clear  that  many  of
decentralization  initiatives  of  the  1970s  that  were  termed  political,  particularly
those  in  north  and  east  Africa  reviewed  by  Nellis  (1983)  and  Rondinelli  (1983)
respectively,  were  far more administrative  in nature  and  did not involve devolution
of powers  and  responsibilities.  For  example,  in  Kenya  administrative  structures
were established  with  centrally-appointed  administrators,  using  old and  mistrusted
colonial  names,  who  owed their  position  to  the  center.  The  results  was  a  lack  of
locally perceived legitimacy  to these  arrangements,  a major reason  for their  failure.
In  contrast  to  decentralization  initiatives  in  the  1970s,  recent  efforts  have
focused  on  encouraging  greater  public  participation  through  the  institutions  of
representative  democracy,  as  the  importance  of popular  participation  has  received
greater  recognition  and  as  concern  with  improving  democratic  processes  has
increased.  Although  democracy  is  not  a  necessary  part  of  decentralization,  its
presence  can  have  a  significant  influence  on  the  perceived  legitimacy  of
decentralized  systems.  Democracy  does  appear  to  improve  methods  of
accountability,  although  an  important  proviso  to  this  statement  is  the  impact  on
disadvantaged  social  groups.  In  their  research,  although  C&M found  that  poor
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people or women  did  participate  more under  decentralized  systems,  they  found  no
evidence  that  either  poverty  or  gender  issues  received  a  higher  priority  in  the
development  process.
Even  in  repressive  political  environments,  democratic  electoral  processes  do
offer  the  opportunity  for local  communities  to  reject  incumbents.  In  Bangladesh,
even though  many local council leaders  were able to dominate  local decision-making
and  use  the  opportunity  for self-aggrandizement,  more  than  90  percent  of them
were  not  reelected8. In  more  open  systems,  the  impact  of  democracy  on
accountability  is likely to have a beneficial  impact  in motivating  local politicians  to
meet the felt needs of local communities.  Satisfying  communities'  perceived  needs  is
a  central  requirement  to  maintain  legitimacy  of  authority.  Thus,  in  Karnataka,
decentralization  caused resources  to be directed  away from government  services  and
toward  the  construction  of micro-level  physical  works,  such  as  roads,  bridges  and
buildings.  This  reallocation  is  in  part  a  reflection  of the  strong  local  demand  for
such types  of projects,  support  for which  was not realized  under  a more centralized
political  system  (C&M).
Meeting  local  demands  as  mediated  through  democratic  processes  may
strengthen  the  autonomy  of devolved  local institutions.  This  may bring  them  into
conflict with  national  governments,  as local authority  also derives  from the  center,
which  retains  the  ultimate  sanction  of taking  back devolved  powers.  In  India,  the
post-independence  constitution  encouraged  the  establishment  of  local,  self-
governing bodies from the village to the district  (the Panchayati  Raj) and  permitted
states  to  support  this  process  by  allowing  for  local  elections  to  these  bodies.
However, the constitutional  provisions  did not require  local bodies to be established
or  elections  held.  As  political  decentralization  would  often  have  challenged  the
entrenched  bureaucratic  practices  of  state  governments'  administrative
departments,  only  a  few  states  experimented  seriously  with  the  ideas.  The  state
governments  of Maharashtra  and  Gujurat  did, however,  implement  Panchayati  Raj
programs  in  the  late  1960s,  only  to  find  the  experiment  in  decentralization
becoming  too  successful  and,  feeling  threatened  by  the  emergence  of  new  local
centers  of power, terminated  the program  (Webster  1990).
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Another  key  issue  with  respect  to  implementing  decentralization  is  the
relationship  between  the  political  and  bureaucratic  institutions  of decentraLization.
Most decentralization  initiatives  stipulate  a range of rules  and  regulations  covering
the-interaction  between  local councils  and  central  government  line  agencies.  How
these  rules  are  interpreted  in  practice  will have  a decisive impact  on the  successful
implementation  of a sustainable  system  of decentralization  that  delivers  more of the
goods and  services local people demand.
In  Karnataka,  decentralization  brought  more  elected  representatives  into  the
process  of RD. The quantity  and  quality  of work  undertaken  by line  agencies  was
closely  monitored  and  problems  reported  early,  and  it  became  harder  for
bureaucrats  to  get away  with  corrupt  acts.  The  result  was  enhanced  institutional
effectiveness  and  improved  coordination  among civil servants  working  for different
line  agencies  (C&M).  In  Ghana,  despite  the  law  on  local  government  giving  an
active  role  to  elected  councilors,  their  ability  to  take  control  of the  bureaucratic
administration  was,  in  practice,  limited  by  the  District  Secretary,  a  central
government  appointee  over whom the council executive  did not have clear  authority
(C&M).
Decentralization  initiatives  that  focus  exclusively  on  electoral  and
administrative  processes without  considering  the fiscal and  institutional  dimensions
will  not  be  sustainable.  In  Nigeria,  a  rapid  increase  in  the  number  of  local
governments  from 301 in  1979 to over  700 by 1982 led to an inevitable  reduction  in
the  finances  and  technical  personnel  available  to  any  one  local  government.  In
addition,  although  local  governments  were  to  receive  10 percent  of the  federation
account  and  10 percent  of state  revenues,  state  governments  proved  able  to divert
these  funds for their  own use (Meenakshisundaram  1994).
It  is  important  to  understand  the  political  limitations  of  decentralization.
Central  governments  will promote and  support  processes  of decentralization  so long
as  they  contribute  to  whatever  political  goals  the  center  hopes  to  realize.  Where
decentralization  brings  undesirable  change,  e.g.,  when  local  interests  challenge
national  ones, decentralization  can be swiftly  reversed.
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Fiscal  Decentralization
If decentralized  institutions  are  to  perform  the  responsibilities  devolved  to them,
they  will  need  an  appropriate  level  of fiscal  resources  to  cover  the  costs  of providing
rural  public  goods  and  services.  Three  main  sources  of revenue  are  available:  own,
locally-generated  resources;  transfers  from  higher-level  institutions;  and  resources
from  borrowing 9.
Own  Resources.  As  we  have  seen  in  the  earlier  discussion  on  rural  areas,  the
level  of  revenues  that  can  be  mobilized  locally  is  severely  restricted.  General
skepticism  about  the  financial  management  capabilities  of  local  institutions,
coupled  with  a  reluctance  on  the  part  of national  governments  to  give  up  control  of
resources  has  resulted  in  local  authorities'  ability  to tax  typically  being  curtailed  or
denied  entirely.  For  example,  in  Zambia,  where  a  recent  initiative  aimed  to  put  in
place  a  matching  grant  program  for  RD,  it was  discovered  that  District  authorities
had  no  power  to  raise  revenues  and  so  had  no  resources  to  match  with  central
government  funds.
Even  where  local  communities  do  have  the  power  to  raise  local  revenues
bestowed  on  them,  this  will  not  necessarily  result  in  them  taking  advantage  of this
option,  especially  if  central  government  prescribes  tax  rates  and  defines  the  tax
base.  The  administrative  costs  associated  with  collecting  local  taxes  may  be
prohibitive.  In  Indonesia,  subnational  governments  have  access  to  more  than  50
taxes,  but  more  that  80  percent  of  revenues  collected  come  from  only  two  taxes
(Shah  and  Qureshi).
In  addition,  improperly  designed  programs  of subnational  revenue-sharing  may
provide  perverse  incentives  to local  institutions  not  to  maximize  local fiscal  effort.  In
Brazil,  due  to  the  generous  provisions  of  revenue-sharing  arrangements
implemented  in  1990,  some  municipalities  increased  public  sector  payrolls  and
wages,  and  lowered  local  property  taxes.
There  is clearly  the  potential  for  macroeconomic  imbalance  if  local  governments
are  permitted  too  much  revenue-raising  autonomy.  If local  governments  are  allowed
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unrestricted  borrowing  without  an  appropriate  system  of checks  and  balances,  fiscal
problems  can  rapidly  emerge.  A  fine  balance  must  be  found  between  designing  a
system  of accountability  that  prevents  severe  fiscal  imbalance,  but  at  the  same  time
does  not  place  unnecessary  restrictions  on  important  local  fiscal  decision-making.
For  example,  restricting  local  authorities'  ability  to  tax  at  rates  they  set  breaks  an
important  avenue  for  increasing  accountability,  as  local  political  processes  offer  the
possibility  for rejecting  high-tax  incumbents.
Writers  often  assert  that  local  communities  do  not  possess  the  resource  base  to
mobilize  enough  resources  (Therkildsen  1994).  While  it is true  that  poor,  rural  areas
are  unlikely  to  be  able  to  cover  all  their  expenditures,  it  is  also  the  case  that  they
are  rarely  permitted  to  raise  any  at  all.  Given  the  opportunity  to manage  their  own
financial  affairs,  local  governments  have  demonstrated  an  ability  to  raise  revenues
and  provide  a wide  range  of services  (Smoke  1992).
Intergovernmental  Fiscal  Transfers.  Although  greater  flexibility  in
permitting  local  institutions  to mobilize  their  own  resources  may  result  in increased
funds  at  the  local  level,  rural  areas  are  likely  to  continue  to be  highly  dependent  on
transfers  from  higher-level  governments.  The  appropriate  design  of  inter-
governmental  fiscal  transfers  (IGFT)  is therefore  of great  importance,  and  there  is  a
rapidly  developing  literature' 0 that  seeks  to  define  a  set  of  principles  to  guide
governments  in  their  design  of IGFT.
To  meet  efficiency  and  equity  goals,  four  main  economic  arguments  have  been
suggested  as justification  for  IGFT:
*  to  bridge  the  fiscal  gap  that  may  result  from  a  mismatch  between  revenue
means  and  expenditure  needs,  leading  to a  revenue  shortfall;
*  to  compensate  for  the  presence  of interregiornal  differentials  in  income  and
resource  capabilities  that  creates  inefficiencies  due  to  fiscally-induced
migration,  as  factors  of production  gravitate  toward  richer  areas;
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*  to ensure  common  minimum  standards  across  jurisdictions  to  enable  poorer
areas  to provide  an  acceptable  level  of service;  and
*  to  alleviate  inefficiencies  arising  from  interjurisdictional  spillouers,  where
people  enjoy  the  benefits  of a public  good  but  do  not  contribute  to  the  cost  of
providing  it,  possibly  resulting  in  subnational  levels  of  government
considering  only  the  benefits  that  accrue  within  their  own  jurisdiction  and
under-providing  the  public  good.
Based  on  these  arguments,  the  theoretical  and  practical  literature  on
decentralization  has  developed  some  useful  advice  on  designing  IGFT.  Few
countries  have,  however,  implemented  grant  programs  that  incorporate  efficiency
and  equity  goals,  and  possess  the  desirable  qualities  of: (i)  transparency-the  basis
on  which  transfers  are  made,  sometimes  through  an  equalization  formula,  must  be
clearly  stated;  (ii) predictability-IGFT  mechanisms  should  ensure  predictability  of
subnational  government  shares  from  year  to year  to  permit  strategic  planning;  (iii)
and  autonomny-subnational  governments  should  have  complete  independence  and
flexibility  in setting  their  own  development  priorities.
Grant  Design.  In  many  developing  countries  non-specific,  general  grants
continue  to be  the  most  important  type  of IGFT.  They  are  often  made  on  an  ad  hoc
basis,  entirely  at  the  discretion  of central  governments,  with  little  effort  to  develop
objective  grant  design  criteria.  A few attempts  have  been  made,  however,  to  include
specific  formulae  designed  to  address  issues  of  horizontal  and  vertical  fiscal
imbalances,  e.g.,  the  Brazil  Municipal  Participation  Fund,  which  considers
municipal  population  and  state  per  capita  income  in  the  determination  of  fiscal
shares  for  individual  municipalities.  The  design  of  this  grant  program  is  an
improvement  over  purely  ad  hoc  arrangements,  although  problems  still  remain  with
the  revenue-sharing  formula  (Shah  1994).
Of greater  relevance  for  the  specific  financing  of RD,  are  conditional  grants,  both
matching  and  non-matching.  Imposing  conditions  on  grant  use  provides  central
governments  with  the  opportunity  to  target  resources  to support  specific  initiatives
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and/or  provide funds for goods and  services  that  may be under-provided  at the local
level, e.g., poverty programs,  and environment  and conservation  projects.
iVon-rn  atching  grantts  transfer  lump-sums  from  central  governments  to
subnational  governments  for specific  purposes.  Indonesia  has  a  major  program  of
block  grants-Inpres-that  cover  many  sectors,  e.g.,  primary  education,  health,
transportation,  and  reforestation  and  conservation.  The  latter,  Inpres
Penghijaun/Reboisasi,  is designed  to encourage  reforestation,  soil conservation  and
regreening  activities  in environmentally  critical  areas.  Grant  allocation  is made  on
a  project-by-project  basis  and  approved  projects  take  three  components  into
consideration:  (i) the  land  area  to be  regreened,  (ii) the  area  to  be conserved,  and
(iii)  field  staff  requirements.  Other  transfers  are  made  on  the  basis  of  various
formulae  designed  to take  into  consideration  critical  indicators  of need  (Shah  and
Qureshi  1994).
This  type  of non-matching  grants  does not,  however,  require  local  governments
to  contribute  any  of  their  own  funds.  There  is,  therefore,  no  incentive  for  local
communities  to mobilize resources  to fund  expenditures  covered under  the  grants.
Matching  grants,  on the other  hand,  require  subnational  governments  to contribute
funds  of their  own if they  are to  obtain  access  to counterpart  funding  from central
government.  They  involve  a  significantly  enhanced  role  for local  governments  in
decision-making  about which projects and  programs  to support  at the local level.
In Brazil,  there  are a large  number  of federal  and  state  specific-grant  programs,
but  most  have  insufficiently  defined  program  objectives. A few grant  programs  are
well  designed,  including  the  unified  and  decentralized  health  system-SUDS
(Sistema  Unificado e Decentralizado  de Saude)-where  federal  financing  is provided
to achieve certain  minimum  standards  of health  care  across the nation  (Shah  1994).
In  India,  specific-purpose-plan  grants  attempt  to  provide  higher  assistance  to
relatively  less  well-off states  in addition  to encouraging  tax  effort  at  subnational
levels; however,  drawn  out  review and  approval  processes  may work  against  these
goals (Shah  1994).
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The  problem  remains  that  even  for  these  types  of  specific  grants  objective
allocation  criteria  are  often  absent  or  inappropriate,  leading  to  ad  hoc  grant
distribution  that  is  at  considerable  variance  with  the  principles  of transparency,
predictability  and  autonomy.  There  is  therefore  considerable  scope  for improving
the effectiveness  of these  grants.
Winkler  (1994),  reviewing  grant  design  and  administration  for education  and
health  in  Chile  and  rural  roads  in  Colombia,  found  that  modifications  to  grant
design have the potential  for realizing  considerable  economic benefits.  The results  of
his  simulations  provide  some important  conclusions:  (i) a simple  grant  design  may
attain  central  government  objectives  as  well  as  a  complex  design;  (ii)  price
incentives, especially  through  matching  grants,  can work just  as well as expenditure
mandates  in increasing  available  resources;  and  (iii) central  governments  can best
leverage  the  effect  of  their  transfers  on  total  expenditures  by  including  some
measure  of the  local jurisdiction's  fiscal  capacity,  although  this  can  increase  the
complexity of grant  design.
The earlier  political  economy discussion  of how urban-based,  industrial  interests
are  able  to  dominate  poor  rural  communities  suggests  why  central  governments
have not been interested  in designing  resource-transfer  programs  that  benefit  rural
areas.  It  is not  surprising  therefore  that  Shah  (1994) finds  no single  country  that
has  designed  a  system  of  IGFT  that  contains  all  the  desirable  elements  of
transparency,  predictability  and  autonomy.  There  is an  inherent  tension  between  a
central  government  that  on  the  one  hand  recognizes  the  potential  gains  possible
from  decentralization,  while on  the  other  is  reluctant  to  give up  real  power  with
uncertain  political  outcomes.
Institutional  Decentralization
From  the  perspective  of central  governments,  the  institutional  dimensions  of
decentralization  are  concerned  with  defining which  formal,  government  institutions
are  to  be  involved  in  a  decentralization  program,  and  the  development  of  an
appropriate  legal  framework  that  defines  the  relationships  between  different
institutions.  From  the  perspective  of  rural  people,  however,  the  institutional
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situation  they  confront  is  likely  to  be  far  more  complex  and  varied.  It  is  not
surprising,  therefore,  that  generalizations  in  the  area  of  institutional
decentralization  are particularly  difficult to define. Nevertheless,  there  do appear  to
be  a  set  of  discernible  conditions  that  enhance  the  prospects  for  successful
decentralization.
First,  there  needs  to  be a  clearly  established  legal framework  that  defines  the
decentralized  institutions,  how they  are  to  be constituted,  and  how they  relate  to
other  institutions.  If pre-existing  institutional  arrangements  can  be  appropriately
modified,  this  task  is  likely  to  be  more straightforward  than  in  the  case  where  a
new set  of institutions  is being created.  Thus,  in  Karnataka,  the  state  government
was  able  to  draw  on  long-standing  enabling  legislation  that  clearly  defined
institutional  arrangements  for  decentralization.  Government  line  agencies  had
already  been  deconcentrated  prior  to  the  implementation  of political  decentrali-
zation.  By contrast,  in Ghana,  where  the Rawlings  government  attempted  to put  in
place a new system  of deconcentrated  line  agencies,  four years  after  the legislation
was passed  these  arrangements  had not been finalized  (C&M).
Second,  an  active  civil  society  appears  to  assist  significantly  in  implementing
decentralization.  Putnam's  (1993) concept of "social capital"  is useful  in focusing on
the  level  of associational  life in  different  societies,  and  highlighting  the  range  of
institutions  available  to  participate  in  decentralization  programs.  In  Ghana,  for
example,  local  communities  have  well-developed  political,  moral  and  legal
institutions  and  possess  identities  that  have  been  encouraged  through  political
competition  and  participation,  and  the  overlay  of  party,  class  and  associational
groupings.  It is no surprise  that  the largest  impact of decentralization  in Ghana  was
felt  in  the  political  arena,  and  participation  in  the  form  of electoral  turnout  was
high.  In contrast,  the results  of decades of one-party  rule in C6te d'Ivoire  resulted  in
"the  almost  unnatural  quiescence  and  political  apathy  of the  Ivorian  countryside
noted  by many  observers,  and  the  underdevelopment  of small  town  life..."  (C&M:
105)
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In Bangladesh,  the process  of decentralization  did permit  more opportunities  for
NGOs to lobby on behalf  of disadvantaged  groups,  and  some groups  of the  poor and
women were able to achieve limited  inputs  into the  decentralized  system.  However,
the  repressive  nature  of rural  social  relations  resulted  in local  elites  being  able  to
exert  a significant  degree of dominance  and  prevent  more substantial  participation
(C&M).
The concept of social capital  is not  without  its  practical  problems,  most  notably
how can its  components  be defined  and characterized?  Furthermore,  if, as  asserted,
social  capital  matters,  we  need  suggestions  as  to  how  it can  be  built?  These  are
questions  beyond  the  scope  of  this  article,  but  need  to  be  addressed  in  future
research.
Third,  decentralized  institutions  need  to  have  the  capacity  to  carry  out  the
powers and  responsibilities  devolved to them.  In the  context  of RD, capacity  means
being able to do the job and actually  improve  service delivery.  However,  the concept
of institutional  capacity  has  also  proved difficult  to define  objectively.  For example,
the  existence  of  a  large  number  of  qualified  personnel  within  a  decentralized
institution,  or  adequate  project  financing  is  only  indicative  of  the  presence  of
capacity,  but does not guarantee  it.
As  we  are  primarily  concerned  with  the  delivery  of goods  and  services,  it  is
possible  to adopt  a  specific interpretation  of institutional  capacity  that  focuses  on:
the  degree  of  resource  mobilization;  cost-effectiveness  in  service  provision;  and
performance  with  respect  to  meeting  minimum  standards  of  service  provision.
Based on this  interpretation,  lack of institutional  capacity  may be reflected  in one or
more of the following:
*  inadequate  funding  to meet  minimum  standards  of service  and provision;
*  inability  to  mobilize  fully  all  resources  available  from  tax  bases,  revenue-
sharing  arrangements  and/or  matching  grant  programs;
*  failure  to deliver  goods and  services cost-effectively; and
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an  inappropriate  mix of services in relation  to local preferences.
Findings  of a study  on municipal  local government  capacity  in Colombia  (World
Bank  1995) suggest  that  there  is considerable  latent  capacity  to be exploited  at  the
local level, if municipalities  are given an active  development  role. By using  existing,
but  underutilized  capacity  and  through  locally-initiated  efforts  to  upgrade
capabilities  most  of the  municipalities  selected  were  able  to  meet  effectively  new
challenges  posed by decentralization.
The study  found that  capacity  does not  necessarily  increase  with  jurisdictional
size. Although  small  municipalities  did have  some difficulties  obtaining  appropriate
professional  support,  they  were  successful  at  implementing  a  range  of simple  RD-
related  projects.  Large municipalities,  with  populations  over 80,000, generally  have
significant  resources  to  draw  on  and  had  sophisticated  organizational  structures
that  enabled  complicated  activities  to  be  successfully  implemented.  Medium-sized
municipalities  (30,000-80,000  people)  faced  the  largest  challenge  as  the  relative
costs of improving  capacity  are high  and  must  be spread  over time.  This  requires  a
long-term  commitment  that  may  conflict  with  the  political  realities  posed  by  a
system  that  elects  mayors  for a single term  of two years.
The  Colombian  experiment  in  decentralization  seeks  to  give political  power  to
decentralized  local  institutions,  to  provide  them  with  resources  to  carry  out
prescribed  functions,  and  to permit  the  inclusion  of a  wide range  of institutions  in
the  decentralization  process.  Focusing  on  the  design  of  the  political,  fiscal  and
institutional  elements  of decentralization  together  has  significantly  increased  the
potential  for successful RD outcomes.
Fourth,  there  needs  to  be  a  proper  system  of accounttability  for  decentralized
institutions  to  each  of their  different  constituents,  and  some  system  of sanctions
that  penalizes  institutions  that  fail  to  carry  out  their  functions  appropriately.
Where accountability  is absent,  the legitimacy  of a decentralization  initiative  can be
lost  quickly.  In Ghana,  where  District  Administrators  were  able to  retain  effective
power because  of their  ties to  the center,  local scandals  involving embezzlement  of
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public  funds  went  unpunished.  In  Bangladesh,  again  because  sub-district  council
chairmen  derived  most  of their  power from the  Ershad  regime  in Dhaka,  they were
permitted  to do  more or less  as  they  wished  and  were  able  to  make  considerable
private  profits  (C&M).
Concern  with  the  institutional  dimensions  of development  is  a  relatively  new
phenomenon.  This  is clearly reflected  in earlier  decentralization  initiatives  in Africa
and  Asia  that  focused  almost  entirely  on  the  administrative  institutions  of
government.  In Kenya,  the  District  Focus for Rural  Development  was implemented
almost  entirely  through  deconcentrated  line  agencies  of central  government.  The
exclusive  focus  on  government  institutions  enabled  the  central  bureaucracy  to
retain  effective power and  served  to alienate  rural  people rather  than  to bring  them
into the development  process:
"Rural  people refused  to participate  in family  planning  clinics  in some  areas
of Kenya  because  they  thought  the  programs  were  established  to  castrate
men before drafting  them  into  the  armed  forces. They did  not  allow land  to
be used  for agricultural  demonstrations  in other  places,  fearing  that  govern-
ment  would  later  take  over the  improved  property.  Rural  road  construction
was disrupted  by some rural  villagers  who thought  that  the new roads  would
allow  government  patrols  to  catch  stock  raiders  more  easily."  (Rondinelli
1983: 109)
Recent  USAID experience  in Peru  suggests  that  capacity-building  approaches  to
improving  decentralized  institutions  need  not  only  to  include  diffusion  of  the
technical  and  organizational  abilities  but  must  be  made  with  reference  to  the
broader  political  system.  As Schmidt  observes  "capacity-building  efforts  in  highly
centralized  systems,  such  as  Peru's,  soon  run  into  limits  related  to  central
constraints.  At some point, political  and  administrative  reforms  at the center  will be
needed to allow continuation  and expansion  of such efforts" (1989, 109).
Although  the decentralization  experiments  in the late  1980s and early  1990s did
see the  scope of institutions  utilized  broadened  to include  elected local councils with
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devolved  powers  and  responsibilities,  other  types  of  institutions,  e.g.,  non-
governmental  organizations,  were still perceived  as peripheral.
More  recent  development  programs  have  begun  to  encourage  actively  the
involvement  of community  groups  and  NGOs by  channeling  resources  for specific
smallscale  productive  or social projects  to beneficiary  groups,  either  directly  or via
intermediation  through  NGOs. This  Social Investment  Fund  approach  (Grosh  1994)
has  flourished  in  many countries,  often where  bureaucratic  or political  institutions
have  been.  Governments,  bilateral  donors  and  multilateral  lenders  have
increasingly  resorted  to this  method.  Social funds  delegate  planning  and  execution
to beneficiary  groups  or  their  NGO agents,  but  they  leave  ultimate  approval  and
disbursement  authority  with  central  project units-the  Social Fund  administrators.
DECENTRALIZED RURAL DEVELOPMENT
Previous  initiatives  have  often  regarded  decentralization  as  a  desirable  end  in
itself-contributing  to greater  participation  and  bringing  decision-making  closer to
the  people-rather  than  as  a  means  of  achieving  improved  RD  outputs  and
outcomes.  However,  our  concern  is  for  decentralization  as  a  means  to  achieve
improved RD outputs  and outcomes.
The outputs  of RD are  the tangible  goods and  services  provided  by the range  of
decentralized  institutions  involved.  Ultimately,  this  will  involve  the  task  of
assigning  powers and  responsibilities  to the  different  institutions  on a sectoral  basis
at the subfunction  level. Some countries,  especially  in Latin  America,  have carefully
worked  through  the  assignment  process  and  have  implemented  programs  of
decentralized  RD  that  address  the  three  dimensions  of  political,  fiscal  and
institutional  decentralization.
Sectoral  Decentralization
The  literature  that  has  dealt  with  issues  of sectoral  decentralization  has  been
primarily  concerned  with  distinguishing  between  which  level of government  should
have  responsibility  for  which  sector.  Shah  (1994),  for  example  notes  that  while
central  governments'  role  in  national  defense  and  security  and  other  issues  of
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national  concern  are  well  recognized.  the  over-extension  of their  powers  into  purely
local  functions,  such  as  pothole  repair  or  pest  control,  is  being  questioned.  His
review  of the  theory  and  practice  of revenue  and  expenditure  assignment  suggests
that  problems  associated  with  governmental  responsibility  arise  mainly  out  of
de facto  assignments  being  at  variance  with  de jure  responsibilities.
However,  a  further  functional  disaggregation  is  needed  in  most  of  the  sectors
relevant  to RD in  order  to  assign  powers  and  responsibilities.  Each  sector  will  have
a  range  of  subfunctions  associated  with  it,  some  similar  across  sectors,  others
differing  due  to the  nature  of the  good  being  provided.
For  example,  rural  roads  are  mostly  a public  good,  when  there  is relatively  little
traffic,  where  the  benefit  one  individual  derives  from  using  a  road  does  not
negatively  affect  the  benefit  another  individual  derives  from  using  it.  Everyone  in  a
community  is likely  to have  an  interest  in building  and  maintaining  a  road,  so there
is  no  conflict  between  the  interests  of local  elites  and  the  poor.  Roads  are  easily
observable,  making  transparency  easier  to  achieve.  The  technologies  required  to
construct  rural  roads  are  simple  and  local  populations  are  likely  to  be  able  to
provide  the  necessary  skills.
Primary  health  care,  on  the  other  hand,  is  entirely  different.  It  is  mostly  a
private  good.  Local  elites  can  exclude  the  poor  and  have  little  interest  in  the
availability  or  equality  of  the  publicly  financed  service.  Use  of  the  service  is  not
easily  monitored,  so transparency  is a  problem.  The  technology  is relatively  complex
and  requires  skilled  manpower  that  is  unlikely  to be available  locally.
Natural  resource  management  issues  are  different  again.  In  the  case  of national
park  management,  local  populations  may  have  diametrically  opposed  interests  to
the  national  or  international  community.  The  costs  and  benefits  of  particular
programs  are  difficult  to  measure  and  are  often  external  to  the  immediate  area,
making  decisions  about  appropriate  levels  of service  hard  to estimate.
Given  the  sector-specific  nature  of decentralization  arrangements  demonstrated
by  the  striking  contrasts  across  sectors,  there  is  a  need  to  undertake  detailed
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investigations  into  how each  sector  should  be  organized  and  identify  appropriate
fiscal  and  institutional  frameworks  for  delivering  services  effectively.  Winkler
(1988), for example,  in  assessing  whether  an  educational  system  is centralized  or
decentralized  argues  for  the  need  to  look  at  the  distribution  of  decision-making
authority  with  respect  to  various  educational  factors.  He proposes  three  questions
that  provide  the  basis  for  discriminating  between  centralized  and  decentralized
systems  of education:
"(i)  Who selects  the chief administrative  officers of the  local schools,  and  what
control do they have over resource  allocation?
(ii)  Which  level  of  government  is  responsible  for  recruiting  and  promoting
teachers?  Is there  a national  pay scale?
(iii)  What  proportion  of total  expenditures  is  financed  through  local  revenue
sources,  both  tax  revenues  and  voluntary  contributions?"  (Winkler  1988:
11).
Recent  Experience  from  Latin  America
As yet there  are few examples  of IGFT specifically designed  for RD in developing
countries.  However, early  analysis  of matching  grant  programs  in Colombia, Mexico
and  Brazil  suggests  that  the  combination  of  political,  fiscal  and  institutional
decentralization  can not only be effective in  increasing  the  availability  of resources
for RD, but  also  results  in  greater  beneficiary  participation  and  influence  over  the
decision-making  process, and  ultimately  to improved  RD outcomes.
Fondo  de  Desarollo  Rural  Integrado  (Integrated  Rural  Development
Fund),  Colombia.  The Fondo DRI was developed  to provide funds to municipalities
to  finance  small  investment  sub-projects  on  a  matching  grant  basis.  Local
communities  provide  labor  and  local  material,  and  municipalities  contribute  a
portion  of the  cash  cost.  Communities  are  involved  from  the  outset  through  the
identification  of needs,  the selection of sub-projects  and the monitoring  of subproject
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execution,  as  well  as participating  directly  in  execution  and  subsequently  operation
and  maintenance  of the  completed  sub-projects.
Selected  sub-projects  are  presented  for  funding  to  the  Fondo  DRI,  which  carries
out  the  appraisal  of  each  subproject.  Only  sub-projects  that  meet  predetermined
criteria,  including  established  technical  and  environmental  standards  and  a
requirement  that  beneficiaries  be  low  income  rural  families,  are  approved.
Subproject  preparation  is the  responsibility  of the  municipalities  themselves.  Fondo
DRI  directly  enters  into  contracts  with  municipalities  to  fund  the  sub-projects.  In
turn,  municipalities  enter  into  agreements  with  communities  and  private
contractors  for the  execution  of the  works  or  services.
Eligible  sub-projects  cover  a  wide  range  of  RD  components,  including:  rural
roads;  water  supply;  rural  electrification;  watershed  management;  minor  irrigation;
agricultural  extension;  marketing;  organization  and  training  of  communities  and
farmers'  groups  and  projects  targeted  at  women.  Fondo  DRI  financed  about  1600
individual  projects  in  1993,  amounting  to  $38  million,  partly  funded  by  WEB  and  the
IDB.
A  key  element  of  the  Fondo  DRI's  strategy  is  aimed  at  reaching  poor
municipalities  that  have  some  agricultural  potential;  however,  these  municipalities
typically  do  not  express  their  demand  for  sub-projects  as  effectively  as  richer
municipalities.  To  redress  this  imbalance,  Fondo  DRI  includes  an  important
capacity-building  component  designed  to  strengthen  weaker  municipalities.  It  has
also  developed  a  mechanism-the  cofinancing  matrix-for  targeting  resources  at
poorer  municipalities  and  at  less  privately  profitable  investments,  with  potentially
large  spillover  effects,  that  are  least  attractive  to  municipalities.  For  example,
funding  natural  resource  conservation  or  agricultural  extension  projects  in  poor
areas  could  attract  a  cofinancing  share  of  up  to  90  percent,  whereas  funding
attractive  infrastructure  projects  in  richer  municipalities  would  attract  a  nominal
10 percent  rate  of cofinancing.
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Municipal  Fund  Program,  Mexico.  The  Municipal  Solidarity  Funds  (FMS),
implemented  under  the  umbrella  of  Mexico's  National  Solidarity  Program,  are
aimed  at  strengthening  the  capacity  of local  municipal  government.  Introduced  in
1990, the FMS have been designed  to demonstrate  how a locally managed  fund  may
be  a  successful  alternative  for  managing  rural  investment  in  technically  simple
infrastructure.  They are intended  to overcome many of the problems associated  with
centrally  planned  and  implemented  rural  infrastructure  projects,  as  the  selection,
budgeting  and  execution  of projects  is carried  out  by local municipalities  and  their
communities.
The program  is now functioning  in most  of Mexico's 31 States  and  has  financed
about  75 thousand  projects  over  the  past  four  years.  Mexico's  four  poorest  States
have benefited  particularly  through  the Decentralization  and  Regional Development
project, partly  financed  by WB, with  653 rural  municipalities  receiving $32.5 million
during  1992.
No complete  analysis  of  the  impact  of  the  FMS  on  municipalities  has  been
carried  out  to date.  However,  a preliminary  report  on the operation  of the FMS  in
Oaxaca State  draws  the following conclusions:
*  The FMS program  is viewed positively  by both municipal  leaders  and project
participants.  Although  the  funds  distributed  per  municipality  were  very
small  and  were  not  always  used  to  finance  the  most  pressing  community
needs,  actually  having a specific budget  for local projects  was perceived  as  a
major step  forward.
*  The  FMS  has  encouraged  a  shift  in  the  intra-rural  resource  balance  away
from  the  municipal  headquarters  by  directing  resources  to  outlying  areas.
For many rural  municipalities,  the FMS program  represents  the first  regular
source  of project  funding,  which  has  enabled  benefits  to  be  targeted  at  the
poorest  areas  and  has increased  their  political  voice within  local government.
*  The program  has not, however,  brought  about any change  in the relationship
between  state  and  municipal  governments.  The  state  government  did  not
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encourage  greater  municipal  autonomy,  nor  did it  develop  the  institutional
capacity of municipalities  to manage  their  own affairs.
*  The impact  of the  FMS program  on local development  has  been constrained
due  to the  low level of grant  allocated  to each  municipality  (approximately
$17,000  per  municipality)  and  the  lack  of  adequate  technical  assistance.
Having  insufficient  funds  to hire  private  sector advisors,  municipalities  have
to rely  on technical  services  provided  by the  State  government  with  all  the
inherent  problems  associated  with public sector agencies.
Fundo  Municipal  de  Apoio  Comunitario  (FUMAC),  Brazil.  As  part  of a
reformulation  of ten RD programs,  partly  funded by WB, being  implemented  in  the
north-eastern  states  of Brazil, a community  support  program  was initiated  by which
municipal  councils  would  be  established  to  screen  and  set  priorities  among
proposals  generated  by poor rural  communities  before submission  to state  technical
units.  The FUMAC program  is an extension  of the Programa  de Apoio  Comunitario
(PAC), which does not involve municipal  councils  and requires  all  project proposals
to be approved by state  technical  units.
Results  of a study  (van Zyl 1995) suggest  that  FUMAC has  outperformed  PAC in
a  number  of ways.  FUMAC projects  are  more  cost-effective  per  beneficiary.  They
reach  more beneficiaries  per comparable  project; cost savings  are  realized  in project
design  and  implementation;  and  overall  costs  are  15-75  percent  cheaper  per
beneficiary.
The  more  participatory  approach  encouraged  by  FUTMAC appears  to  have
achieved better  targeting  of poor people, mobilized additional  resources  by requiring
direct  community  contributions,  and  attained  greater  sustainability  through
increased  community participation.
The impact  of these three  programs  in Latin  America on developing  the  capacity
of rural  municipalities  to respond  to the  needs of their  communities  is likely to be as
important  in the long-run  as the immediate  impact  achieved through  specific project
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investments.  For  the  first  time,  rural  municipalities  are  taking  an  active  role  in
local development  in partnership  with  their  communities.
CONCLUSIONS
We  have  emphasized  decentralization  as  a  multi-dimensional  process  that
proceeds  with  successes  and  setbacks.  Decentralization  initiatives  will therefore  be
subject  to a continuous  process  of modification  reflecting  changes  in  social, political
and  economic conditions.  What  emerges  from the previous  discussion  is the  need to
include  all  three  dimensions  of political,  fiscal  and  institutional  decentralization.
We  have  proposed  a  souffle  theory  of  decentralization  that  recognizes  the
impossibility  of  designing  a  single  strategy  for  decentralization,  and  instead
illustrates  the  importance  of different  decentralization  components  and  suggests
factors  that  appear  to have either  a beneficial  or detrimental  impact  on RD outputs
and outcomes.
Nevertheless,  there  remains  a  serious  gap  in  our  understanding  of the  various
dimensions  of  decentralization.  The  degree  and  different  types  of  patterns  of
decentralization  have  not  been described  and  measured  in  a consistent  way across
countries  or over  time,  so that  at  best  only  an  anecdotal  characterization  of the
decentralization  of RD and  rural  service  delivery  programs  can  be  made.  Without
consistent  description  and  measurement  of the patterns  of decentralization,  it is not
even possible  to assess  the issue  of whether  greater  decentralization  in some form is
associated  with  greater  success  in  RD  and  rural  service  delivery,  or  whether  it
results  in better  targeting  of the poor and  reduced  poverty levels. Even less can one
investigate  issues of whether  greater  decentralization  causes better  RD outcomes.
Conceptual  Framework
Cheema  and  Rondinelli  (1983) recognized  the  importance  of the  political,  fiscal
and  institutional  elements  of decentralization,  but  none  of the  authors  explicitly
related  these  three  dimensions  to RD outcomes.  These  outcomes  can be defined  in
terms  of: (i) effectiveness-providing  minimum  standards  of service  delivery  cost-
effectively,  and  targeted  toward  disadvantaged  groups;  (ii) the  responsiveness  of
decentralized  institutions  to the demands  of local communities,  at the  same  time as
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meeting  the  aims  of broader  public  policy; and  (iii) sustainability  as  indicated  by
political  stability,  fiscal  adequacy  and  institutional  flexibility.  Factors  that  appear
to have a  positive  impact  on RD outcomes  include:  enhanced  participation;  greater
resource  mobilization;  more  institutional  capacity-building;  and  increased
accountability.
Figure  1: Conceptual  Model  for  Analyzing  Decentralization
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What  becomes  clear  from  the  foregoing  analysis  is  the  need  for  a  systematic
approach  to decentralization.  Hard-and-fast  rules  are  impossible  to discern.  Like a
souff1e that  requires  just  the  right  combination  of maL,  eggs and  heat  to  rise,  so a
successful  program  of  decentralization  will  need  to  include  nust  the  right
combination  of pot tical, fiscal and institutional  elements.
Trhis  "souffn.  theory  of  decentrahzation"  attempts  to  bring  together  the
dimensions  of decentral4zation  and  relates  them  to  a  set  of interme4iate  outcomes
that  are  likely  to  have  an  important  impact  on  overall  RD outputs  and  outcomes
(Figure  1).  This  simplified  conceptual  model  provides  a  useful  framework  for
analyzing  the separate  dimensions  of decentralization  and  their  interlinkages,  and
permits  the investigation  of patterns  of decentralization  across countries.  This is an
essential  first  step  in  developing  a  fuller  characterization  of  the  dimensions  of
decentralization  .
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Further  Research
Many  of the  general  observations  made  in  WB's  1974 policy document  on  RD
remain  true  today,  and  a  significant  proportion  of rural  people  continue  to  live in
poverty.  Past  RD  initiatives  have  not  brought  about  the  anticipated  sustained
improvement  in  the  rural  standard  of living.  However,  rather  than  learning  from
mistakes  and  building  on  successes  to  formulate  a  new  strategy  for  RD,  there
appears  to  be  little  debate  on  the  appropriate  design  of  RD  policies,  leaving  a
vacuum  with  no  coherently  defined  policy  on  RD.  In  particular,  the  failure  to
recognize the  complexity  associated  with  implementing  programs  of RD is likely  to
seriously  compromise  any attempt  at rural  poverty  reduction.
There  is,  therefore,  an  urgent  need  for  additional  investigation  to  examine
questions  and issues  that  the literature  on RD and  decentralization  has so far  failed
to address.  Further  research  is needed to address  the  following issues  raised  in this
paper:
*  How  can  the  important  dimensions  of  decentralization  be  described  and
quantified?  To  develop  characterizations  to  enable  analysis  of the  fiscal,
institutional  and  political  arrangements  that  determine  how  rural  public
services  are  delivered  in  developing  countries  requires  a  review  of:
(i) government  institutions  and  the  formal  and  informal  mechanisms  that
influence  how  they  operate  and  (ii) non-government  institutions  (e.g.,
lineage-based  groupings;  associations;  patron-client  networks;  community-
based  groups;  NGOs;  political  parties)  and  the  mechanisms  that  influence
how they operate.  It will also be necessary  to describe  and  analyze  the inter-
relationships  between  government  and  non-government  institutions.
*  If, as is generally  argued in the literature,  decentralizing  responsibilities  will
bring  about  a  improvement  in  RD  outputs  and  outcomes,  why  have
governments  adopted  decentralized  systems  so rarely  in practice?  What  are
the  underlying  political,  economic  and  social  factors  that  influence  the
direction,  pace and  outcome of rural  decentralization  efforts?
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*  What  features  of  decentralized  administrative,  fiscal  and  political
arrangements  would  help  the  poor  derive  greater  benefits  from  rural
development  and  reduce the capture  of benefits  by local elites?  What  features
would assist  in ensuring  sustainable  management  of natural  resources?
*  How  can  measures  of  government-sponsored  decentralization  efforts  and
non-government  institutional  systems  be  used  to  quantify  the  impacts  of
various  forms of decentralization  on rural  service  delivery,  rural  growth  and
rural  poverty?
*  What are the  determinants  of the capacity  of decentralized  local government
and  non-government  institutions  to deliver  rural  public  services?  When and
how can  these  two types  of institutions  act  as  complements  or substitutes?
Are special  capacity-building  programs  required  for either  or both,  and  if so
how should they be designed  and financed?
*  How  can  one  account  for  differences  among  sectors  associated  with
differences  in  service-delivery  objectives  and  different  sectoral  outputs  and
technologies?  How  should  the  design  of  sector-specific  institutions  and
programs  reflect these  differences?
*  What  are  appropriate  mechanisms  for  ensuring  accountability  of  local
government  and  non-government  institutions  to: (i)  poor  beneficiaries  and
local  taxpayers  and  (ii)  higher  levels  of  government  and  international
agencies?  Available  mechanisms  include  both  formal  financial  controls-
covering  disbursement,  auditing  and  procurement,  and  informal
mechanisms,  such  as political  and  various  community  controls.  What  mixes
of financial,  political  and  community-based  mechanisms  allow  for efficient
local service delivery?
*  What  has been the  role of donor  policies and  guidelines  on procurement  and
disbursement  of  project  funds  in  reinforcing  centralizing  tendencies  and
undermining  attempts  to  decentralize  financial  authority  in  developing
countries?
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Notes:
I  An  IFAD  study  (Jazairy  et  al  1992) reported  that  more  than  one-third  of the
developing  world's  rural  population  lived  below  the  poverty  line  in 1988.
2  This  review  paper  does  not  go  into  detail  concerning  the  need  to  implement  good
macroeconomic  policies.  Binswanger  (forthcoming)  highlights  the  negative  impact  of  poor
macroeconomic  policies  on the  design  of agricultural  and  RD policies  and  programs.
3  Cross-country  evidence on the  correlation  between  various  measures  of government
intervention  in agriculture  and  agricultural  as well as overall economic growth suggests  that
agricultural  as well  as economic growth  were  slowed down by  government  intervention  in
agriculture.  There  is  substantial  evidence  for  the  large  impact  over  time  of  depressing
agricultural  incentives  on reducing  agricultural  investment  and  growth  and  increasing  rural-
urban  migration;  for a review, see Binswanger  (1993).
4  Transfers  out  of  agriculture  averaged  46  percent  of agricultural  gross  domestic
product a year.
5  Some  studies  have  provided  positive  evidence  of the  importance  of spatial  and
product-wise  concentration  as a mechanism to obtain trade  benefits  (e.g., Amelung  1989).
6  This  integrated  approach  to  RD  has  a  long  history  that  predates  the  Bank's
endorsement  of it. In addition,  during  the  1970s it was widely  adopted  by other  aid agencies
as the primary  RD strategy.
7  Biggs  (1984:  64)  has  observed  that  "feed-back  systems  between  extension  and
research  institutions  are  more evident  as two-way arrows  on an  organizational  chart  in  an
office of the  Ministry  of Agriculture,  rather  than  as senior  scientists  responding  to reports
coming from village level extension agents."
8  Of course, an effectively functioning  democratic  system  requires  the electoral  process
to be perceived  as broadly  free and  fair,  a major problem  with  local elections in  Bangladesh
in 1988, where  widespread fraud led to the undermining  of the Ershad  regime (C&M).
9  The  capacity  to borrow  funds  through  financial  markets  is  likely  to  be  restricted  to
larger  urban  areas,  and  will be of little relevance  to poor rural  areas.  In any case, the  power
to  borrow  independently  is  a  function  rarely  granted  to  rural  local  governments.  We
therefore  do not discuss this  issue here.
10  Shah  (1994) provides  a  detailed  review  of this  literature,  covering  public  choice
theory and  fiscal federalism.
I am  grateful  to Hans  Binswanger  for suggesting  this  apt  analogy.
47Decentralization: The Way Forward for Rural Development?
REFERENCES
Amelung, T. 1989. "Determinants  of Protection  in Developing  Countries:  An
Extended  Interest-Group  Approach" Kyklos 42: 4, 515-32
Bahl R.W. and Linn, J.F.  1992. Urban Public Finance  in Deueloping Countries  (New
York: Oxford University  Press)
Bates, R.H. 1983. "Patterns  of Market  Intervention  in Agrarian  Africa" Food Policy
8, 297-304
Becker, G.S. 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure  Groups  for Political
Influence" Quarterly  Journal  of Economics 98: 3, 371-400
Becker, G.S. 1985. "Public Policies, Pressure  Groups  and Deadweight  Costs"
Journal  of Public  Econoinics 28, 329-47
Biggs, S. 1984. "Awkward but  Common Themes  in Agricultural  Policy". In Clay and
Schaffer  1984, 59-74
Binswanger,  H.P.  1994. Agricultural  and Rural  Development:  Painful  Lessons
Simon Brandt  Address  delivered at 32nd annual  meeting  of the Agricultural
Economics Association of South Africa. Processed.  (Washington  DC: World
Bank)
Binswanger,  H.P. and Deininger,  K. 1995. Towards  a Political Economy of
Agriculture  and Agrarian  Relations  Processed.  (Washington  DC: World Bank)
Binswanger,  H.P.,  Deininger,  K. and Feder,  G. 1993. Power, Distortions,  Revolt and
Reform  in Agricultural  Land Relations  Policy Research  Working Paper  No. 1163
(Washington  DC: World Bank)
Binswanger,  H.P.  and Rosenzweig, M.R. 1986. "Behavioral  and  Material
Determinants  of Production  Relations  in Agriculture"  Journal  of Development
Studies  22, 503-39
Bird, R. and Wallich, C. 1993. Fiscal Decentralization  and Intergovernmental
Relations  in Transition  Economies: Toward  a Systematic  Framework  of Analysis
Policy Research  Working Paper  No. 1122 (Washington  DC: World Bank)
Brock, W.A., Magee, S.P. and Young, L. 1989. Black  Hole Tariffs  and  Endogenous
Policy Theory: Political Economy in General Equilibrium  (New York: Cambridge
University  Press)
Buchanan,  J.M.  and Tollison, R.D. 1984. The Theory of Public  Choice -II (Ann
Arbor: University  of Michigan  Press)
48Decentralization: The Way Forward for Rural Development?
Campbell,  T., Peterson,  G. and Brakarz,  J.  1991. Decentralization  to Local
Government  in LAC: National  Strategies  and Local Response  in Planning,
Spending  arnd  Management  Latin  America  and the Caribbean  Technical
Department,  Regional  Studies  Program,  Report No. 5 (Washington  DC: World
Bank)
Cheema,  G.S. and  Rondinelli, D.A. eds.  1983. Decentralization  and  Development:
Policy Implementation  in Developing Countries  (Beverly Hills: Sage)
Clay, E. and  Schaffer, B. eds.  1984. Roorn for Manoeuvre: An Exploration  of Public
Policy Planning  in Agricultural  and Rural  Development  (London: Heinemann)
Cohen, S.S., Dyckman, J.W., Schoenberger,  E., and Downs C.R. 1981.
Decentralizationt: A Framework  for Policy Analysis  Project on Managing
Decentralization  (Berkeley: University  of California)
Crook, R. and  Manor. J.  1994. Enhancing  Participation  and Institutional
Performance: Demnocratic  Decentralization  in South  Asia  and  West Africa
Overseas  Development  Administration,  United  Kingdom.  Processed.
Dillinger,  W. 1994. Decerntralizationt  anLd  Its Imrlplications  for Urban Service Delivery
Urban  Management  Programme  Discussion  Paper  No. 16 (Washington  DC:
World Bank)
Feder,  G. and  Slade, R. 1986. "The Impact  of Agricultural  Extension:  The Training
and Visit  System  in India"  World Bank Research Observer 1: 2, 139-161
Gardner,  B.L. 1987. "Causes  of U.S. Farm  Commodity  Programs"  Journal  of
Political Economy 95: 2, 290-309
Grosh, M.E.  1994. Administering  Targeted Social Programs  in Latin  America: From
Platitudes  to Practice World Bank  Regional and  Sectoral  Study  (Washington  DC:
World Bank)
Harris,  R.L. "Centralization  and Decentralization  in Latin  America".  In Cheema
and Rondinelli  1983, 183-202
Hayami, Y. and Anderson,  K. 1986. The Political Economy of Agricultural
Protection: East Asia  in International  Perspective (Boston: Allen and Unwin)
Hulme, D. 1992. "Enhancing  Organizational  Effectiveness  in Developing Countries:
The Training  and Visit System  Revisited"  Public Administration  and
Development  12: 5, 433-445
Jaffee, S. and Srivastava,  J.  1992. Seed System  Development:  The Appropriate  Roles
of the Private  and Public Sectors World Bank  Discussion  Paper  No. 167
(Washington  DC: World Bank)
49Decentralization: The Way Forward for Rural Development?
Jazairy,  I., Alamgir,  M. and Panuccio, T. 1992. The State of World Rural  Poverty: An
Inquiry  itnto Its Causes and Consequences (New York: New York University
Press)
Johnston,  B.F. and  Southworth  H.M. 1967. Agricultural  Development  and  Economic
Growth (Ithaca:  Cornell University  Press)
Krueger,  A. 1974. "The Political  Economy of the Rent-Seeking  Society" American
Economic Reuview  64, 3: 291-303
Lacroix, R. 1985. Integrated  Rural  Deuelopment  in Latin  Amnerica  World Bank  Staff
Working Papers  No. 716 (Washington  DC: World Bank)
Lele, U. 1979. The Design of Rural Development:  Lessons from Africa  Third printing,
with  new postscript  (Washington  DC: World Bank)
Lewis, W.A. "Comment".  In Johnston  and Southworth  1967, 493-6
Lipton,  M. 1977. Why Poor People Stay Poor: A Study  of Urban Bias  in  World
Development  (Cambridge:  Harvard  University  Press)
--.  1993. "Urban Bias: Of Consequences,  Classes and  Causality"  Journal  of
Development  Studies  29: 4, 229-58
Meenakshisundaram,  S.S.  1994. Decentralisation  in Developing  Countries (New
Delhi: Concept Publishing  Company)
Nellis, J.R.  1983. "Decentralization  in North Africa: Problems  of Policy
Implementation".  In Cheema  and  Rondinelli  1983, 127-182
Olson, M. 1971. The Logic of Collectiue Action: Public  Goods and  the Theory of
Groups (Cambridge,  MA: Harvard  University  Press)
Olson, M. 1985. "Space, Agriculture  and Organization"  American  Journal  of
Agricultural  Economtics 67, 928-37
Posner,  R.A. 1975. "The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation"  Journal  of
Political  Economy 83, 4: 807-27
Putnam,  R. 1993. Making  Democracy Work (Princeton:  Princeton  University  Press)
Rondinelli. D. 1981. "Government  Decentralization  in Comparative  Perspective:
Theory and Practice  in Developing Countries"  International  Review of
Administrative  Scientce 47
Rondinelli,  D.A. 1983. "Decentralization  of Development  Administration  in East
Africa". In Cheema  and Rondinelli  1983, 77-125
50Decentralization: The Way Forward for Rural Development?
Ruttan,  V. 1975. "Integrated  Rural Development  Programs:  A Skeptical
Perspective"  International  Deuelopment Reuiew XVII, 4: 9-16
Ruttan,  V. 1984. "Integrated  Rural Development  Programmes:  A Historical
Perspective"  World Deuelopment  12, 393-401
Schiff, M. and Vald6s, A. 1992. The Plundering  of Agriculture  in Deueloping
Countries (Washington  DC: World Bank)
Schmidt,  G.D. 1989. Donors and Decentralization  in Deueloping Countries: Insights
from AID Experience irn  Peru (Boulder: Westview Press)
Shah, A. 1994. The Reform  of Intergouernmental  Fiscal Relations  in Developing and
Emerging  Market Economies Policy and Research  Series  No. 23 (Washington
DC: World Bank)
Shah.  A. and Qureshi,  Z. 1994. Intergouernrnental  Fiscal Relations  in Indonesia:
Issues and  Reform Options World Bank  Discussion Paper  No. 239 (Washington
DC: World Bank)
Smoke, P. 1992. "Rural  Local Government  Finance:  The Case of Muranga'a  County
Council" Public Administration  and Development  12, 87-96
Thirkildsen,  0.  1994. Econornic Decline and Democratic Decentralization  in Rural
Sub-Saharan  Africa  Paper  presented  at the Conference  on Democratic
Decentralization  in Africa and Asia, September  21-23. Processed.
Tullock, G. 1984. "The Backward Society: Static  Inefficiency, Rent Seeking,  and  the
Rule of Law". In Buchanan  and Tollison  1984, 224-237
Umali, D. 1992. Public and Priuate Sector Roles in Agricultural  Research World
Bank  Discussion Paper  No. 176 (Washington  DC: World Bank)
Umali,  D. and Schwartz,  L. 1994. Public and Private Agricultural  Extension:  Beyond
Traditional  Frontiers World Bank  Discussion Paper  No. 236 (Washington  DC:
World Bank)
Umali, D., Feder,  G. and de Haan,  C. 1992. The Balance  between Public and  Private
Sector Actiuities  in the Delivery of Livestock  Seruices World Bank Discussion
Paper  No. 163 (Washington  DC: World Bank)
Varshney,  A. 1993. "Introduction:  Urban  Bias in Perspective"  Journal  of
Development  Studies  29: 4, 3-22
Webster, N. 1990. Panchayati  Raj and  the Decentralization  of Development
Planning  in West Bengal: A Case Study  CDR Project Paper  90.7 (Copenhagen:
Center  for Development Research)
51Decentralization:  7he Way Forward for Rural Development?
Winkler,  D. 1988. Decentraliztion  in Education:  An Economic Perspective Policy,
Planning  and  Research  Working Paper  No.143 (Washington  DC: World Bank)
Winkler, D. 1994. The Design and Administration  of Intergovernmental  Transfers:
Fiscal Decentralization  in Latin America  World Bank  Discussion  Paper  No. 235
(Washington  DC: World Bank)
World Bank.  1974. Rural  Development  and Bank  Policies: A Progress Report
Agriculture  and Rural  Development Department,  Report No. 588 (Washington
DC: World Bank)
-.  1987. World Bank  Experience with Rural  Development  Operations  Evaluation
Department,  Report No. 6883 (Washington  DC: World Bank)
------. 1993. New Lessons from  Old Projects: The Workings of Rural  Development  in
Northeast  Brazil  Operations  Evaluation  Department  (Washington  DC: World
Bank)
----. 1989. Decentralizing  Revenues and the Prouvsion of Services: A Review of
Recent Experience Colombia, Report No. 7870-CO (Washington  DC: World Bank)
---.  1990. Provincial  Government Finances Argentina,  World Bank  Country  Study
(Washington  DC: World Bank)
---.  1992a. Decentralization  and Fiscal Issues Venezuela,  Report No. 11 160-VE, 2
volumes (Washington  DC: World Bank)
----.  1992b. Subnational  Government  Finance Chile, Report No. 10580-CH
(Washington  DC: World Bank)
52Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for  paper
WPS1450  Social  Safety  Net and  the Poor  Fareed  M. A. Hassan  May  1995  F. Smith
durng the Transition:  The  Case  of  R. Kyle  Peters,  Jr.  36072
Bulgaria
WPS1451  Tunisia's Insurance  Sector  Dimitri  Vittas  May 1995  P. Infante
37642
WPS1452  The 1985-94  Global  Real  Estate  Bertrand  Renaud  May 1995  R.  Gamer
Cycle:  Its Causes  and Consequences  37670
WPS1453  Air Pollution  and Mortality:  Results  Bart  Ostro  May  1995  C. Bemardo
from Santiago,  Chile  Jose Miguel  Sanchez  37699
Carlos  Aranda
3unnar S. Eskeland
WPS1454 Child  Labor.  A Review  Christlaan  Grootaert  May 1995  M. Youssef
Ravi Kanbur  34614
WPS1455  Tentative  First Steps:  An Assessment  Bemard  Hoekman  May 1995  F. Hatab
of  the Uruguay  Round  Agreement  35835
on Services
WPS1456  Equity Markets,  Transaction  Costs,  Valerie  R. Bencivenga  May  1995  P. Sintim-Aboagye
and  Capital  Accumulation:  An  Bruce  D. Smith  38526
Illustration  Ross  M. Starr
WPS1457  Does Decentralization  Increase  Antonio Estache  May  1995  WDR
Spending  on Public  Infrastructure?  Sarbajit  Sinha  31393
WPS1458  Credit Policies:  Lessons  from East  Dimitri  Vittas  May 1995  P. Infante
Asia  Yoon  Je  Cho  37642
WPS1459 Pension  Funds  in Central  Europe  Dimitri  Vittas  May 1995  P. Infante
and Russia:  Their Prospects  and  Roland  Michelitsch  37642
Potential  Role  in Corporate  Govemment
WPS1460 Efficiency  and Equity  Considerations Yacov  Tsur  May  1995  C. Spooner
in Pricing  and  Allocating  Irrigation  Ariel  Dinar  32116
Water
WPS1461  Stock  Market  Development  and Firm  Asli Demirguc-Kunt  May  1995  P. Sintim-Aboagye
Financing  Choices  Vojislav  Maksimovic  38526
WPS1462  Stock Market  Development  and  Asli Demirgu-Kunt  May  1995  P. Sintim-Aboagye
Financial  Intermediaries  Ross  Levine  38526
WPS1463 Rural  Nonfarm  Employment:  A Survey Jean 0. Lanjouw  May 1995  J. Shafer
Peter  Lanjouw  85581Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for  paper
WPS1464  How Does the North American Free  Edward E. Leamer  May 1995  S. Vallimont
Trade Agreement Affect Central  AHonso Guerra  37791
America?  Martin Kaufman
Boris Segura
WPS1465  Post Trade Liberalization Policy  Sarath Rajapatirana  May 1995  J. Troncoso
and Institutional Challenges in  37826
Latin America and the Caribbean
WPS1466  Ownership and Financing of  Charles D. Jacobson  June 1995  WDR
Infrastructure:  Historical  Joel A. Tarr  31393
Perspectives
WPS1467  Beyond the Uruguay Round: The  Jeffrey D. Lewis  June 1995  B. Kim
Implications of an Asian Free Trade  Sherman Robinson  82477
Area  Zhi Wang
WPS1468  Govemment's  Role in Pakistan  Rashid Faruqee  June 1995  C. Anblah
Agriculture: Major Reforms are Needed  81275
WPS1469  The Role of Labor Unions in Fostering  John  Pencavel  June 1995  WDR
Economic Development  31393
WPS1470  Pension Systems and Reforms:  Patricio Arrau  June 1995  E. Khine
Country Experiences and Research  Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel  37471
Issues
WPS1471Pension Reform and Growth  Giancarlo Corsetti  June 1995  E. Khine
Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel  37471
WPS1472  Fiscal and Monetary Contraction in  Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel  June 1995  E. Khine
Chile: A Rational-Expectations  Luis Serven  37471
Approach
WPS1473  The Surge in Capital Inflows to  Eduardo Femandez-Arias  June 1995
Developing Countries: Prospects and  Peter J. Montiel
Policy Response
WPS1474  Are Stable Agreements for Sharing  D. Marc Kilgour  June 1995  C. Spooner
Intemational River Waters Now  Adel Dinar  32116
Possible?
WPS1475  Decentralization: The Way Forward  Andrew N. Parker  June 1995  D. Housden
for Rural Development?  36637